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This thesis examines how Bernard Lonergan’s structure of the human good might serve 
as a tool to bridge the tension between principle-based and communitarian approaches to 
bioethical enquiry. 
The first chapter discusses one of the current mainstream tools used in clinical and 
medical research bioethical evaluation which is principlism. Though there are many 
principles and a variety of interpretations, I will focus on the four major principles as laid 
out by Beauchamp and Childress which are autonomy, non maleficence, justice and 
beneficence.  In particular, this chapter investigates in some detail the principle of 
autonomy and its relationship with the notions of respect for persons, liberal 
individualism and the human rights ideology. Chapter two explores an alternative 
approach to bioethics based on  communitarian philosophy and will draw on the works of 
Daniel Callahan, in particular his arguments on the common good. From the first two 
chapters it appears that there may be a tension between the concepts of individual good 
and common good that, up till now, some argue bioethicists have not been able to bridge. 
The final chapter explores how Bernard Lonergan’s structure of the human good might 
bridge these two areas of tension by reframing the meaning and significance of rights, 
liberty, individual good and common good. In this way Lonergan’s method might help us 
grasp and respond to bioethical issues in an altogether new way. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
                     
                                                                                                                                            iii 
  
 Table of Contents 
Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
Chapter 1:     The Principlism Approach------------------------------------------------------8 
1.1 A Brief History of Bioethics --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
1.1.1 Theology’s Influence on the Development of Bioethics --------------------------------- 12 
1.1.2 The Belmont Report ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14 
1.2 The Four Principles of Bioethics--------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
1.3 The Concept of Autonomy in North American Bioethics ------------------------------------- 22 
1.4 Weaknesses of Principlism ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 
Chapter 2:      The Communitarian Approach ----------------------------------------------- 30 
2.1 The Communitarian Philosophy --------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
2.1.1 The Common Good ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
2.1.2 The Tension between the Common Good and Individual Good ----------------------- 33 
2.1.3 Defining Community ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 
2.2 The Communitarian Turn in Bioethics ------------------------------------------------------------- 40 
2.2.1 The Challenge of Communitarian Bioethics ----------------------------------------------- 43 
Chapter 3:     Bridging the Principle - Communitarian Divide --------------------------- 49 
3.1 Communitarianism as a Corrective to Principlism ---------------------------------------------- 50 
3.2 Lonergan: Freedom, Objectivity and the Structure of the Human Good ------------------- 54 
3.2.1 Cognitional Process Structure ------------------------------------------------------------------ 58 
3.2.2 The Human Good as a Dynamic Process. --------------------------------------------------- 65 
3.2.3 The Theological Aspect of the Human Good -------------------------------------------------- 76 
3.3 Case Study: Legalizing Euthanasia in Quebec --------------------------------------------------- 85 
3.3.1 Euthanasia Debate in Quebec ------------------------------------------------------------------ 85 
  
3.3.2 Discussion: Lonergan’s Structure of the Human Good as a Bridge between 
Principlism and the Communitarianism in the debate on euthanasia. ----------------------------- 88 




Bioethics continues to be very important today, as we face great challenges as to what 
defines us as human beings and what type of civilization we envision. For example, with 
advances in genetics and in vitro fertilization we now have the capability for made-to-
order children by selecting gender, eye colour, intellect and health.  However, by the 
same token, we also have the ability to deny the existence of individuals that do not fit 
the collective ideal. The letter of the law says that it is within parents’ right to select the 
attributes of their offspring, but just because this is legal, is it indeed the right thing to 
do? On the surface, this may seem straight forward, but with deeper reflection the choices 
available may not be so clear-cut. For example, are we doing right by our children to pre-
select their attributes? Are we doing right by our society to deny the existence of 
individuals who would have certain physical challenges? Bioethics offers a platform to 
voice our questions, concerns, experiences and insights from different perspectives, 
providing a more comprehensive picture of the issues than medicine or law alone.  
Bioethics is best understood as a movement, rather than an academic discipline which 
began to take shape in the 1960’s and 70’s in response to revelations of unethical 
treatment of people participating in medical research.
1
 This movement was further 
propelled by the growing popularity of the human rights movement which continues to 
fundamentally steer bioethical deliberation to this day.  
                                                          
1
 According to Albert Jonsen, David Rothman coined Bioethics as a movement in his book titled, Strangers 
at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making (New York: 
Basic, 1991). Albert R Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics," Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 
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Thus the concepts of patient autonomy, informed consent and justice would become the 
building blocks of main-stream principles in Bioethics. Tom Beauchamp, who was a 
contributor to the Belmont Report along with James Childress would go on to expand the 
principles in their seminal work the Principles of Biomedical Ethics
2
 which continues to 
be the source guide for bioethics today.  
Although disciplines within humanities have been engaged in bioethical enquiry, their 
focus on metaethical aspects such as the concepts of teleology, ontology, utilitarianism 
and that of distributive justice,3  despite being central to bioethics, has been viewed as too 
cumbersome for real-life situations. For example, Bernard Gert states that: 
     Not seeing how the abstractions and high level generalizations of moral theory could 
ever take into account the particulars of moral experience, many have concluded that 




Those who are faced with making practical, and often difficult ethical decisions, needed 
tools for interpreting everything from individual concepts of values, to commission guide 
lines, to conducting medical research and data gathering. Therefore the “principles” as 
laid out by Beauchamp and Childress were seen as offering a clear-cut way of 
deliberating and ultimately making decisions when ethical conflicts arose. Childress 
himself states that “principle-based method must hold that general moral action guides 
are central to moral reasoning in bioethics…appeals to ‘principles’ most often occur 
when there is uncertainty or conflict about the appropriate course of action.”5  
                                                          
2
 Tom Beauchamp & James Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. . 6th ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press (2009) 
3
 Ghislaine Cleret de Langavant,. Bioéthique : Méthode et complexité.c. (2001). p 26 
4
 Bernard Gert et Al. Bioethics: A systematic Approach. (2006). p.4 
5
 James Childress. “Methods in Bioethics.” Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. (2007). p.17 
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Although Beauchamp and Childress argued that all four principles are equally important, 
the principle of autonomy has gradually begun to exercise a greater influence in decision 
making over the other principles. In fact, this principle now excises the most influence in 
North American bioethical debates.
6
  For example, the principle of autonomy “was the 
central principle in the 1996 decriminalization of physician-assisted suicide in the US 
ninth Federal District Court.”7  
The rise in importance of the principle of autonomy began in the 1980’s with the 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research and has also taken up centre-stage in Canada in the work of the 
Canadian Law Reform Commission, the Walker Commission in Australia, and in the 
U.K. in the work of Raanan Gillion.”8  Although the principle of autonomy was 
originally grounded in the principle of respect for persons as laid out in the Belmont 
Report, autonomy would appear to become disconnected from the fundamental principle 
of respect for persons. One of the main concepts now underpinning autonomy is the 
ideology of self-determination.  Bruce Jennings argues that “as an ethic, autonomy means 
living according to your own values and principles, as these are refined in the light of 
informed, rational deliberation and settled conviction.”9 The general appeal of the 
concepts of human rights combined with those of self-determination has reinforced the 
belief that autonomy was synonymous with freedom of rights which is at the core of 
                                                          
6
 Among those who advocate the supremacy of the principle of autonomy, see: R Gillon “Ethics needs 
principles—four can encompass the rest—and respect for autonomy should be “first among equals.”J Med 
Ethics2003;29:307-312; Daniel Callahan. “Principlism and Communitarianism”. J Med Ethics2003;29: 
287–91; A.V.Campbell. “The Virtues (and Vices) of the Four Principles.” J Med Ethics2003;29:292–6; and 
Rendtorff, J D.N. Weisstub and G.D. Pintos (eds.), Autonomy and Human Rights in Health Care 36 Vol. 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2008  
7 Bruce Jennings. “Autonomy.” Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. 2007. p.76 
8
 Bruce Jennings. “Autonomy.” p.73 
9
 Bruce Jennings. “Autonomy.” p.80 
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American liberalism.  In other words, the autonomous individual acts in accordance with 
a self-chosen plan.
10
   This understanding of the principle of autonomy trumps all other 
ethical principles and is the centre point of social policies and legal frameworks.  
 
However, increasingly over the past decade, many stakeholders have been questioning 
the efficacy of relying solely on the principles to evaluate issues, especially given the 
extent to which new technologies challenge our notions of health, happiness and human 
nature itself.  For example, Daniel Callahan argues “that given the complexity and 
unknown nature of new technological developments, “principlism” is no longer sufficient 
by itself to adequately frame bioethical enquiry.”11 
Many of the critics of principlism are calling for a more “communitarian” perspective to 
bioethics.
12
 What underpins their argument is the concept of the common good.  It is not 
surprising then to see that their efforts are aimed largely at the principle of autonomy; in 
particular its overarching weight in settling conflicts. The main argument is that 
autonomy lacks the scope to take into consideration the impact of an individual’s choice 
on the greater society. For example, under the law a state may allow physician assisted 
suicide for those deemed to be terminally ill, but that same legal framework could in turn 
be used to euthanize the weak and vulnerable in our society.   
Callahan continues to call for bioethical enquiry that would include a concern for the 
greater good, the good of society. In his article “Individual and Common Good: a 
                                                          
Bruce Jennings. “Autonomy.” p.77 
11
 Daniel Callahan. “Individual Good and Common Good: A Communitarian Approach to Bioethics.” 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46.4 (2003) p.497 
12
 For example among those who advocate communitarianism, see Callahan, D. “Individual Good and 
Common Good: A Communitarian Approach to Bioethics.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46.4 
(2003); Etzioni, A. “The Common Good and Rights.” Law and Ethics. Winter/Spring 2009; and 12 
Argandona, A. “The Common Good.” University of Navarra. Working Paper WP-937. July 2011. 
 5 
 
Communitarian Approach to Bioethics,”13 he lays out a line of questioning that would 
include the perspective of the common good in bioethical enquiry.  Callahan states that 
bioethical enquiry must contain the standpoints of both principlism and 
communitarianism if bioethics is to continue to provide meaningful insights into how 
scientific advancements impact our society and the future we envision.  However, the 
article stops short of addressing how to bridge the tension between the principle of 
autonomy and the language of human rights and the common good. 
This is the debate that this thesis is entering. Given the tension between the principle-
based and communitarian approaches to bioethics, I will explore how Bernard 
Lonergan’s structure of the human good might bridge the impasse between them.  
Lonergan’s structure of the human good is an analytical tool which helps evaluate 
cultural issues in a concrete setting and it is “based on our human nature, needs and 
abilities, capacity for development and freedom.”14 More specifically, Lonergan defines 
the components of the human good as being the set of our “feelings, skills values, beliefs, 
cooperation… [which]… is both individual and social.” 15  
What is of particular interest for the purposes of this thesis, is precisely the analysis of the 
interactions between the individual and society as this speaks directly to the issues 
surrounding the disparity between the concepts of autonomy and the human good.  The 
arguments presented will be structured in large-part with Lonergan’s eighteen-term 
structure of the human good. The objective of this exploration is not to produce a 
                                                          
13
 Daniel Callahan. “Individual Good and Common Good: A Communitarian Approach to Bioethics.” 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46.4 (2003) p.497 
14
 Shawn Copeland. “A genetic study of the idea of the human good in the thought of Bernard Lonergan.” 
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses; 1991; ProQuest Dissertations & Theses (PQDT) p.225 
15
 Bernard Lonergan.  Method in Theology. 1972. p. 27 
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“methodology” for doing bioethics, but rather to propose a hermeneutical approach.  
Such an approach would seek to understand different viewpoints by taking into 
consideration cultural and social aspects that form these viewpoints.
16
 Being open to the 
“other” in this way may provide an invitation to dialogue for moving bioethical enquiry 
in a direction that will lead us to better individual lives and the flourishing of our society.  
This thesis is divided in three chapters.  The first chapter describes one of the current 
mainstream tools used in medical and scientific bioethics debate, which is principlism. 
This chapter traces the evolution of principlism and how it came to be one of the 
underpinning forces behind bioethical inquiries. Though some may argue that there are 
many principles and a variety of interpretations, I focus on the four major principles as 
laid out by Beauchamp and Childress which are autonomy, non maleficence, justice and 
beneficence. This chapter closes with an exploration of one of the principles in particular, 
that of autonomy. In particular, I highlight the North American context where the 
principle of autonomy appears to have become the principle which trumps all others 
when conflicts arise between the principles.   
Chapter two explores an alternative approach to bioethics, that of communitarianism. 
This discussion will focus on the application of the communitarian philosophy in 
bioethics and will focus on works done by Daniel Callahan, in particular his arguments 
on the common good.  
The final chapter has a two-fold objective: first, it will discuss how the communitarian 
approach might provide a corrective to the pitfalls found in principlism, and to the issues 
surrounding the stronghold of autonomy in making bioethical choices.  Secondly, it 
                                                          
16
Guy Widdershoven. “Dialogue in Evaluation: A Hermeneutic Perspective.” Evaluation Vol. 7(2): p.253  
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explores how Bernard Lonergan’s structure of the human good might provide the tools to 
help us bridge of the concepts of communitarianism and principlism. From the 
perspective of bioethics, where life and death are often at the centre of debates, Lonergan 
offers an explicitly Christian paradigm whereby death and suffering need not be the final 
word.  Such a message of hope has never been more needed than in the context of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide debates. Thus, the chapter concludes with a 
case study of the euthanasia debate in Quebec to concretely demonstrate how we can 
engage the structure of human good to address the overriding consideration given to the 
principle of autonomy and human rights and the need to consider the common good. It is 
my hope that this case study might serve as an example that it is possible to find a 
common basis for dialogue, not only between principlism and communitarianism, but 




Chapter 1:     The Principlism Approach 
This chapter will trace the evolution of principlism and how it came to be the 
underpinning force behind North American bioethics. Though there are many principles 
and a variety of interpretations, I will focus on the four major principles as laid out by 
Beauchamp and Childress which are autonomy, beneficence, non maleficence and 
justice.   
I will begin by discussing the strength of how these principles are applied in bioethics as 
well as their limitations.  This will lead into an exploration of how the principle of respect 
for autonomy has become the principle which some argue trumps all others when 
conflicts arise in the course of bioethical enquiry. 
1.1 A Brief History of Bioethics 
The exact beginnings of bioethics are difficult to pinpoint. According to Doucet the 
evolution of bioethics occurred in two significant phases
17
: the first, from the 1960’s to 
the mid-1970’s addressed foundational issues, and from the 1980’s until today, the focus 
has been on applied bioethics. David Rothman argues that the introduction of Bioethics 
was part of a “movement,”18  which sprang from intersecting concerns about the impact 
of new medical technology from the fields of medicine, science, philosophy and politics. 
However, there were two events in particular that served as an impetus to concretize this 
new movement into what would become known as bioethics. David Callahan writes that 
many argue that the first event was an article that appeared in Life Magazine entitled 
                                                          
17
 Hubert Doucet., et al. Ethical Deliberation in Multi-Professional Health Care Teams. 2001. p.24 
18
 According to Albert Jonsen, David Rothman coined Boethics as a movement in his book titled, Strangers 
at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making (New York: 
Basic, 1991). Albert R Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics," Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 
23, no. 6 (1993), p.2 
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“They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies”.19 This article outlined the fact that a committee of 
lay people were making life and death decisions by “choosing” which patients would 
receive the then-new dialysis treatment, given that there was limited space at the 
treatment centre and it was very expensive. This was the first time in medical history that 
a committee of this kind was set up to make what some considered was essentially a 
medical decision by non-medical experts. The King County Medical Society opted to 
create this committee on the one hand to relieve physicians from having to carry the 
weight on their own of choosing who would live or die but also because of a perceived 
need to establish a fair and adequate method for selecting candidates.
20
 This committee 
was made up of seven people, including a housewife, a minister, a labour leader and one 
surgeon (who sat on this committee as a citizen, not a surgeon).  They were not given any 
guiding rules on how to go about choosing candidates. In fact, one of the consulting 
physicians told Alexander that “...we told them frankly that there were no guidelines, 
they were on their own.”21 Fully aware of their responsibilities and wanting to choose in 
fairness, the group originally thought of selecting patients by lottery but eventually 
established evaluation criteria which focused on an individual’s perceived value to the 
community, such as their wealth, their professional contribution, volunteer activities or 
how many dependants they had. Despite having come to a consensus, some of the 
Committee members had apprehensions about these life and death decision they had been 
called upon to make. For example the Minister said that “...I was very bothered. I felt I 
was forced to make decisions I had no right to make, and I felt that, out of necessity, our 
                                                          
19
 Daniel Callahan. “In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics.” P.xii 2012 
20
 Albert Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics," Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 23, no. 6 
(1993). 
21
Shana. Alexander, . “They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies.”  Life Magazine. Nov. 9 Vol.53 (1962) p.106  
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selections would have to be made on the basis of incomplete information.”22 This 
committee continued to serve the dialysis treatment facility, anonymously, in this fashion 
for a number of years. “America in the 1960s had become acutely aware of 
discrimination as a social problem... The authorities of the past, namely physicians, 
seemed inadequate.”23  
The article also marked one of the first times in modern history that ordinary citizens 
began to question the medical field.  It is interesting to note the foresight of one of the 
committee members who was quoted as saying “the central problem here is that medicine 
has moved forward so rapidly it has advanced beyond the community’s support...[and 
about the committee]...we ought not to go on this way.”24 Reflecting back on these 
changes Albert Jonsen states that “It was not the maliciousness and callousness of 
scientists but the very nature of modern biomedical science that created the problem.”25  
A few years after the publication in Life magazine, another article appeared in the New 
England Journal of Medicine calling for the need to establish ethical standards in the 
pursuits of scientific research involving human beings. Henry Beecher’s article entitled 
“Ethics and Clinical Research” 26 was revolutionary at the time as it directly criticized 
medicine for carrying out scientific experiments on humans in an unethical way.  In this 
article, Beecher documents medical experimentation spanning a decade where patient’s 
health and lives were put at risk in the name of progress. His arguments focused on two 
issues in particular which would become cornerstones in the development of modern-day 
                                                          
22
 Shana Alexander.. “They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies.” Life Magazine. Nov. 9 Vol.53 (1962) p.115 
23
 Albert Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics," Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 23, no. 6 
(1993).S1 
24
 Shana Alexander. “They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies.”  p.118  
25
 Albert Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics,".S1 
26




applied bioethics: the need for informed consent (that is, the need to fully disclose the 
nature of the experiment, including potential negative side effects to participants or their 
guardians) and for an “intelligent, informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible 
researcher
27.” Beecher stressed that not all actions are permissible in the quest for 
scientific progress and that such unethical research would “do great harm to medicine 
unless soon corrected.”28 
Though these two articles stood out as signal posts ushering a new era in the way of 
thinking about healthcare sciences, there were several other intersecting advancements 
that would propel the discipline of bioethics into being. Daniel Callahan argues that: 
     Also during the 1960’s, the contraceptive pill was invented, the first heart transplants 
were performed, intensive care units came into widespread use, complaints about the 
care of the dying grew as medical technology greatly expanded its capacity to keep 





These events impacted traditional medical ethics on two fronts: While clinical ethics 
struggled with defining the role of medicine in the advent of these new technologies, 
research ethics became concerned with protecting and respecting the weak and vulnerable 
in society.
30
 Thus, Rothman states that:  
     By the mid-70’s both the style and the substance of medical decision making had 
changed. The authority that an individual physician had once exercised covertly was 




                                                          
27
 Henry Beecher. “Ethics and Clinical Research.” p. 1360 
28
 Henry Beecher. “Ethics and Clinical Research.” (1966) p.1360 
29
 Daniel Callahan. “In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics.” P..xii 2012 
30
 Albert Jonsen, ed., "The Birth of Bioethics," Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 23, no. 6 
(1993).S1 
31
 David Rothman. Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical 
Decision Making (New York: Basic, 1991). p..2 
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As a result, Herbert Doucet states that “bioethics took up a lot of room in the political, 
legal, administrative and public arena, as well as in the university, not to mention the 
print and electronic media.”32 The key players in this early phase of the bioethics 
movement to ponder these issues came from the disciplines of theology, medicine and 
science.
33
 According to Doucet, one of their primary objectives was “finding ways for the 
whole community to be responsible for the process of facilitating the emergence of a 
modern medicine which would be humane.”34 However, Doucet further argues that at that 
time social implications of scientific advancement were generally a low priority among 
academics, with the exception of theologians.
35
 
1.1.1 Theology’s Influence on the Development of Bioethics 
Theologians’ ability to influence the bioethics movement was largely due to the fact that 
“religious communities had cultivated long-standing tradition of reflecting on life, death, 
and suffering and had given more guidance on the specifics on moral conduct than had 
moral philosophy at that time.”36 Theologians such as Richard McCormick, Paul Ramsey 
and James Gustafson, were among the first to formally bring religious ethics to bioethics.  
Reflecting on the issues impacting clinical and research ethics, they began to call for a re-
examination or course-correction of the way medico-scientific research on humans was 
being carried out and also cautioned about the shifting objectives of medicine in general 
                                                          
32
 Hubert. Doucet. “How Theology Could Contribute to the Redemption of Bioethics from an 
Individualistic Approach to an Anthropological Sensitivity.” Catholic Theological Society of America 
Proceedings. p.55 
33
 Hubert Doucet. “How Theology Could Contribute to the Redemption of Bioethics from an Individualistic 
Approach to an Anthropological Sensitivity.” p.55 
34
 Hebert Doucet. “How Theology Could Contribute to the Redemption of Bioethics from an Individualistic 
Approach to an Anthroplogical Sensitivity.” Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings. p.55 
35
 Hubert Doucet. “How Theology Could Contribute to the Redemption of Bioethics from an Individualistic 
Approach to an Anthropological Sensitivity.”p.55 
36
 Lisa Cahill. Theological Bioethics : Participation, Justice, and Change. 2005 p.14 
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as a result of scientific advancements.. For example, in a submission to the Journal of 
American Medical Association, Richard McCormick strongly echoed Beecher’s concern 
for the need for informed consent when conducting research on human subjects.
37
 
Meanwhile, Paul Ramsey was calling for a cessation of research involving in vitro 
fertilization until its ethics were revised, arguing that there were potential dangers in 
“replacing natural procreation with the idea of manufacturing our progeny.”38  
At the heart of theologians’ arguments was a perspective which spoke not only of the 
basic biological nature of the human being but also its transcendent nature which comes 
from being created in the image of God. The understanding of man’s dual nature 
underpinned calls for medical sciences to be compassionate, caring and respectful of all 
human life.
39
 For example, Paul Ramsey prefaced an interdisciplinary conference by 
asking “what are the moral claims upon us in crucial medical situations and human 
relations in which some decision must be made about how to show respect for, protect, 
preserve, and honor the life of fellow man?”40  
A good example of applying this questioning was in searching for appropriate responses 
to end-of-life care, in particular on the subject of physician assisted suicide and 
euthanasia (a topic I shall explore in greater detail in Chapter three).  Ramsey addressed 
                                                          
37
 Richard McCormick, S.J., "Experimental Subjects- Who Should They Be?" Journal of the American 
Medical Association. 235 (May 17, 1976),p. 2197. 
38
 Paul Ramsey. “Ethical Objections against in vitro Fertilization.” Journal of American Medical 
Association 220 (11) (1972): p. 1480 
39
 Carla Messikomer et al. “The Presence and Influence of Religion in American Bioethics.” 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 44(4): .(2001), 485–508, p.340 
40
 The Center for Bioethics and Culture. “The Birth of Bioethics: Who is Paul Ramsey?” http://www.cbc-
network.org/2006/11/the-birth-of-bioethics-who-is-paul-ramsey-2/ paragraph 9, accessed on April 27, 2013 
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this issue in his article “The Indignity of Dying with Dignity”41 where he refutes the 
emerging popular idea of “dying with dignity,” and the ensuing call to legalize 
euthanasia. The idea of allowing people to choose the timing and manner of their death 
when suffering became too much to bear began to be framed as more humane than letting 
people go through the natural progress of life to death. Ramsey turned this concept on its 
head by framing “dignity” as being conferred on society when it cares for the sick and 
dying with compassion and solidarity, rather than on the person who has reached the end 
of their earthly journey. Ramsey builds his argument on the Gospel message’s central 
tenet that so God loves us, we must in turn love our fellow humans and it is by this love 
that we are called to take responsibility to safeguard the sanctity of life. In other words, 
Ramsey believes that true filial love, lived in the Gospel message eradicates the fear of 
death: quoting from Saint John’s second Epistle “where fear is, love is not perfected,” 
Ramsey states “where fear of death and dying remain, medical and human care of the 
dying is not perfected.”42 However, as the next section will demonstrate, Ramsey’s “rich 
canon of fidelity [would be] reduced to the bare concept of informed consent”43 while the 
notions of respect for persons and sanctity of life would become limited to respect for 
autonomy.    
1.1.2 The Belmont Report 
In response to these harsh criticisms of the conduct of the biomedical industry, 
particularly regarding research involving human beings, further fuelled by the growing 
                                                          
41
 Paul Ramsey. “The Indignity of Dying with Dignity.” Hastings Center Report. Vol2, No.2 (1974) 47-62  
42
 Paul Ramsey. “The Indignity of Dying with Dignity.” Hastings Center Report. Vol2, No.2 (1974). p.56 
43
 Center for Bioethics and Culture. “The Birth of Bioethics: Who is Paul Ramsey?” http://www.cbc-
network.org/2006/11/the-birth-of-bioethics-who-is-paul-ramsey-2/ paragraph 9, accessed on April 27, 2013 
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popularity of the human rights movement, governments began to be pressured to oversee 
a greater accountability from medicine and science. Thus in 1974 the US Government 
amended the Public Health Service Act by signing into law the National Research Act.44  
The purpose of this new act was to “assure the continued excellence of biomedical and 
behavioral research and to provide for the protection of human subjects involved in 
biomedical and behavioral research and for other purposes.”45 
To support this Act the US Congress initiated the National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research.  Since the work carried out by 
the Commission was so important, to which Albert Jonsen credits it with bringing “into 
being a discipline of ‘bioethics,”46  it is worth discussing in some detail here. The 
objective of this Commission was to establish ethical principles which would underpin 
biomedical research and to develop a common guideline by which this research was to be 
carried out in respect of the defined principles. Over the course of four years, 
interdisciplinary teams comprised of physicians, theologians, policy makers, academics 
from the sciences and humanities and representatives of special interest groups, would 
discuss four areas of concern to the Commission, notably:  
“(i) the boundaries between biomedical and behavioral research and the accepted and 
routine practice of medicine; 
 (ii) the role of assessment of risk-benefit criteria in the determination of the 
appropriateness of research involving human subjects; 
(iii) appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for participation in 
such research; and  
(iv) the nature and definition of informed consent in various research settings.”47 
                                                          
44
 Public Law 93-348. July 12.1974  
45
Public Law 93-348. July 12.1974 
46
 Albert Jonsen. “The Birth of Bioethics.” Hastings Center Report. November 1993;23(6):S1 
47 National Commission, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 





The end result of the Commission’s deliberations was summarized in the Belmont 
Report.
48
 The Belmont Report was divided into three major components: 
 Boundaries between Practice and Research; 
 Basic Ethical Principles; and 
 Applications. 
 
The last two components are of particular interest to this discussion. The work carried out 
by the Commission was the first instance whereby a set of ethical principles were clearly 
delineated for the purposes of biomedical research. Though it was not lost on the 
interdisciplinary teams that many ethical principles underpin the fields of medicine and 
science, the Report narrowed its focus on three principles in particular to be applied in the 
context of conducting research on human subjects, which are summarized below;
49
 
 Respect for Persons: Individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and 




 Beneficence: Efforts must be made to secure the well-being of all participants, 
that is, by doing no harm and maximizing possible benefits and minimize possible 
harms; and 
  
 Justice: Whereby the burdens and benefits of the research should be distributed 
fairly in the society. 
  
Furthermore, in fulfillment of its mandate, the Commission created a framework which 
was to help guide researchers applying the three principles in practice.  This last section 
of the Report, “Applications,” addressed practices in biomedical research that had been 
hitherto heavily criticised: 
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 The need for Informed Consent; 
 Assessment of Risk and Benefits; and 
 Selection of Subjects 
 
Ultimately, the narrow list of ‘principles’ and ‘application’ guidelines in the Report 
“were created to simplify decision making” and "met the need of public-policy makers 
for a clear and simple statement of the ethical basis for regulation of research."
 51 Such a 
process appeared easy to understand, evaluate and replicate across various biomedical 
research situations, which in turn made it easier for researchers and government to 
demonstrate their compliance with the new rule and fit neatly into an increasingly 
bureaucratic system.
52
 This setup is still in use today in many research environments. For 
example, in Canada there are Research Ethics Boards (REB) and in the US, Institutional 
Review Boards (IRB).  The primary responsibility of these ethical boards is to ensure that 
medical research on human beings carried out under their umbrella is done so ethically. 
Therefore, by being able to refer to a ‘short” list of ethical principles and ‘applications,’ 




This method of referring to the principles to evaluate biomedical ethics became known as 
principlism.  Though principlism came out of the need to safeguard individuals taking 
part in medical research projects, it quickly became a cornerstone to the bioethics 
movement in general.  Its rise to popularity was fuelled in part by ever increasing 
biotechnological advancements which required government intervention  in the form of 
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regulations, health policy and public funding and by the fact that that the ‘principles’ had 
become a matter of public law.  In addition to this, while the Belmont Report was being 
drafted, one its contributors, Tom Beauchamp, along with James Childress, were also 
looking at defining ethical principles. Their interest, however, was in framing ethical 
enquiry in the field of healthcare in general, not limited to the scope of research ethics.    
Together, they would redefine the scope of the Belmont principles in their seminal work 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
54
 Combined with the enactment of the Natural Research 
Act, their work became the source guide in biomedical ethics, particularly by those who 
were involved in making clinical decisions in the context of bioethical regulations in 
hospitals and research facilities.
55
 
Although the field of humanities had also been engaged in the bioethics movement 
during this time, their focus on metaethical aspects such as the concepts of teleology, 
ontology, utilitarianism and that of distributive justice,
56
 despite being central to 
bioethics, was viewed as too cumbersome for real-life situations.
57
 Those who were faced 
with making practical, and often difficult ethical decisions, needed tools for interpreting 
everything from individual concepts of values, to commission guide lines, to conducting 
medical research and data gathering. Therefore the principles as laid out in the Belmont 
Report and by Beauchamp and Childress were seen as offering a clear-cut way of 
deliberating and ultimately making decisions especially when ethical conflicts arose: 
One ought not to have to be a philosopher to deal with the moral problems of clinical 
medicine or, for that matter, of health policy. It is helpful to have some reasonably 
clean ways to cut through the experiential and social dimensions of actual decision 
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making, where time and knowledge are limited. On that score, principlism achieves 





Childress himself states that “principle-based method must hold that general moral action 
guides are central to moral reasoning in bioethics…appeals to ‘principles’ most often 
occur when there is uncertainty or conflict about the appropriate course of action.”59  
Since reliance on the principles, particularly those defined in the Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, continues to underpin North American bioethics and is the primary tool for ethical 
enquiry for those who are in clinical, regulatory or policy-making contexts, it is worth 
exploring them in greater detail.
60
 
1.2 The Four Principles of Bioethics 
Although the three principles of respect for persons, beneficence and justice as described 
in the Belmont Report had become part of public law, Beauchamp and Childress argued 
that the scope and definition ascribed to these principles were somewhat lacking.  In 
particular, they felt that the concept of respect for persons (that individuals should be 
treated as autonomous agents, and persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to 
protection) was in fact two distinct principles:  “Respect for autonomy and the protection 
and avoidance of harm to incompetent persons.”61 Thus, the principle of respect for 
persons was repackaged as two separate principles: the principle of respect for autonomy 
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and a principle of non maleficence.  This is a key shift in medical ethics since in doing so 
the notion of respect for persons founded on their transcendental nature is lost. I will 
discuss the implications of this shift in further detail in Chapter three, particularly with 
respect to how this influences the current euthanasia debate. 
In the end, Beauchamp and Childress, settled on four principles: 
Respect for Autonomy:  a norm
62
 of respecting the decision making capacities of 
autonomous persons; 
Non maleficence: a norm of avoiding the causation of harm; 
Beneficence: a group of norms providing benefits and balancing benefits against 
risks and costs; and 




The principles are assumed to “function as an analytical framework” which serve as 
“guidelines” for conducting ethical inquiry.64 As the term “framework” implies, the set of 
principles are not meant to be used as foundations or as a methodology for doing 
bioethics.  Rather, the principles are meant to be applied on a case by case basis. This 
bottom-up approach involves taking stock of an ethical dilemma, applying the 
appropriate principles to then determine the correct course of action.  For example, in a 
clinical setting, Hubert Doucet maps out a four- stage process to undertake bioethical 
deliberations using the principles:  
First step: “Fact finding - presentation of the situation”; 
Second step: “Identify the moral and ethical issues at stake”; 
Third step: “Apply the principles to the bioethical problem”; 
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Fourth step: “What to do.” Choosing “one principle over the other will be the 
appropriate foundation for the choice of action.” 65 
 
The framework for applying the principles and subsequently choosing the determining 
principle is based on the concept that there is no pre-established rank amongst the 
principles; each one is evaluated according to the issues impacting the choice of action in 
a given situation: 
All four principles are binding all things being equal, but each can be outweighed in 
a particular context by another principle… however, the ‘principles’ different 
weight cannot be assigned in advance. They can only be ordained in particular 
contexts in addressing cases or policies.66   
 
Weighing the principles at play in a particular context is done by applying a two-step 
process, referred to as “specifying” and “balancing” the principles. Specifying limits the 
scope of the principle(s) in question while balancing determines which of the principles 
will carry the stronger weight. For example, there was a landmark case where a 
terminally ill patient wished to end her suffering by physician-assisted suicide. Medical 
health providers were faced with the dilemma between the principle of non maleficence 
and the principle of respecting the patient’s autonomy. It was decided by the courts that 
the principle of respect for autonomy carried the greater weight and ruled in favour of the 
patient’s wish to die. In fact, the weight carried by the principle of respect for autonomy 
also led to the “1996 decriminalization of physician-assisted suicide in the US ninth 
Federal District Court.”67 
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Although Beauchamp and Childress have argued that all four principles are equally 
important, and can outweigh each other depending on a particular circumstance, the 
principle of respect for autonomy has been exercising a greater influence in healthcare 
decision making than any of the other principles.   In fact, Bernard Gert has stated that 
the principle of autonomy “seems to be the centerpiece of principlism. 68  It is cited more 
frequently than any of the others and has taken on a life of its own.”69 An example of the 
reach of this principle in North American bioethical debates is evidenced by the 1996 
decriminalization of physician-assisted suicide in the US Ninth Federal District Court 
cited above which was based primarily on the respect for patient’s autonomy.70 The next 
section will unpack the philosophical underpinnings of the principle of respect for 
autonomy and its impact on the bioethics movement. In particular it will discuss how this 
overriding effect of the principle autonomy is an example of reductionism with respect to 
the original principles governing bioethics, such as respect for persons and solidarity with 
society’s most vulnerable. 
1.3 The Concept of Autonomy in North American Bioethics 
We recall as noted above, the principle of autonomy was grounded in the principle of 
respect for persons. However, the notion of the principle of respect for autonomy has 
gradually become more about respect for freedom of choice and self-determination, 
rather than about ensuring informed consent and protection of vulnerable individuals. 
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Bruce Jennings describes autonomy in a way that sums up the ideologies of both Kant 
and Mill: “as an ethic, autonomy means living according to your own values and 
principles, as these are refined in the light of informed, rational deliberation and settled 
conviction.”71 The philosophical underpinnings of autonomy are found primarily in the 
ideologies of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Although both Mill and Kant believed 
that autonomy was dependent upon a person’s rationality,72 Kant viewed autonomy as a 
moral condition, which is “our capacity of acting in accord with moral reason.”73 Mill, 
however, understood it from a socio-political perspective, as “the rights of man… and… 
personal autonomy as being central to liberal democracy: The freedom of the individual 
to choose his or her life…”74 According to Mill, an individual’s freedom is given through 
their self-determination.  
However, it is Mill’s philosophy and in particular his notion of self-determination that 
underpins the concept of autonomy in North American bioethics. This framing of the 
concept of autonomy is further supported by Beauchamp and Childress who describe 
autonomy in a similar vein, as a “personal rule of the self that is free from controlling 
interference by others and from personal limitations that prevent meaningful choices. The 
autonomous individual acts in accordance with a self-chosen plan.”75    
Self-determination had already been a part of the American fabric since a landmark case 
in 1914 involving a surgery that was performed without the patient’s consent.  In it, the 
judge ruled that “every human being of adult years, and sound mind has the right to 
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determine what shall be done to his body.”76 This language was also echoed by the highly 
influential human rights ideology, which promotes the notion that all individuals within a 
society have a right to their freedom, dignity and to the pursuit of happiness. The general 
appeal of the concepts of human rights combined with those of self-determination 
reinforced a belief that autonomy was synonymous with freedom of rights which is at the 
core of American liberalism. Together these concepts came to overpower Kantian notions 
of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy became associated with the 
respect for an individual’s freedom. In fact, the theologian Joseph Fletcher is said to have 
“departed from the usual theological analysis to stress the freedom and authority of the 
patient. This viewpoint led him to expound remarkably liberal positions about euthanasia, 
truth-telling, and patients' rights.”77  
This philosophy has become ingrained in applied bioethics especially given that it is also 
at the core of Beauchamp and Childress’ work, which states: 
This principle can be stated as negative obligation and as a positive obligation. As a 
negative obligation: Autonomous actions should not be subjected to controlling 
constraints by others. The principle asserts a broad, abstract obligation that is free of 
exceptive clauses, such as “We must respect individuals' views and rights so long as 
their thoughts and actions do not seriously harm other persons.” This principle of 





As mentioned previously, the idea of respecting a patient’s autonomy grew out of the 
principle of respect for persons stemming from the Belmont Report, at the core of which 
was the guideline to obtain informed consent from subjects participating in biomedical 
research.  Together, respect for autonomy and informed consent had a significant impact 
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on the patient-physician relationship. Traditionally, guided by the Hippocratic Oath, 
physicians played a leading role in deciding treatment options for their patients.  
However, with the growing ideologies of autonomy and human rights combined, this 
began to be seen by some as too paternalistic and patients began to take on a more 
decisive role in their healthcare.
 79
  The significance of autonomy and human rights 
becoming “ideologies” will become apparent in the next chapter. For now suffice to say 
that as ideologies, autonomy and human rights provide a set of references, sort of 
benchmark, by which things are measured. 
1.4 Weaknesses of Principlism 
Increasingly over the past decade, many stakeholders have been questioning the efficacy 
of relying solely on the principles to evaluate issues, especially given the extent of which 
new technologies challenge our notions of health, happiness and human nature itself.  For 
example, David Callahan argues “that given the complexity and unknown nature of new 
technological developments, “principlism” is no longer sufficient by itself to adequately 
frame bioethical enquiry.”80  Thus, one of the weaknesses of relying on the principles is 
that they are “too general and vague, cannot be ranked and do not provide a clear-cut 
decision procedure for resolving actual or potential conflicts”81 Although Childress and 
Beauchamp argue that specifying and balancing principles addresses this concern, Gert 
however, argues that despite this mechanism, choosing between principles remains rather 
arbitrary: 
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     …there seem to be no underlying connections among the principles. They do not grow 
out of a common foundation and …although each may be an expression of one or 
another important and traditional concern of morality, their relationship with one 
another is never discussed. Specification is presented as general procedure for 
resolving the conflicts…but there is no guide for how one is supposed to specify a 
principle.82 
 
This lack of connection between the principles mentioned by Gert can be attributed in 
part because there is no formal foundation or methodology for doing bioethics. Both 
Doucet and de Langavant have argued that relying on the set of principles is a poor 
substitute for methodology:  
     In pluralist societies, it is recognized that individuals and groups do not share the same 
philosophical system or ethical theory. If in a moral philosophy principles are 
justified, according to these authors, by ethical theories, what is the theory that 




Furthermore, the lack of relationship and connection between the principles makes 
principlism an abstract concept “which substitute for and take the place of contextual 
human reason.”84 More specifically, some argue that principlism fails to take into 
consideration the influence of culture, which provides the context for human reasoning. 
To this point Rendtroff states “it is not likely that people in their ordinary life actually 
make independent and rational decisions without the intervention of other people. In fact, 
few decisions in extreme situations follow the requirement of personal autonomy.”85 
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Maier and Shibles emphasize that business and culture can exert a great influence on 
medicine, so much so, that it can even enslave it.
86
 Weisstub supports this belief by 
stating that “the preoccupation with autonomy and self-determination in Western 
bioethics is indicative of the extent to which cultural values influence our orientation to 
biomedical morality.”87 We see evidence of this in how the “beliefs about personhood 
and autonomy inform every aspect of medical transaction, including notions about 
consent and confidentiality in the patient-physician relationship.”88 This issue is further 
accentuated by the language being used in biomedical ethics, such as the centrality of 
rights-based language, primarily surrounding the principle of respect for autonomy.   
De Langavant further exemplifies the problem by stating that these principles can only be 
expressed in a closed cultural matrix, defined by common beliefs, norms and narratives, 
something which has become almost impossible to define. Therefore, “the resulting 
“principles” are shown to be reductivist in nature.”89 Even more reductivist, is the 
overarching weight of the principle of respect for autonomy and its emphasis on freedom 
of choice. Some scholars, such as Gert, are voicing strong opposition to the 
predominance of this principle in the course of bioethics. 
90
   
Thus autonomy’s dominance has been widely regarded as both a judicial and 
philosophical problem, not only because its practical application must be balanced 
with other moral tenets, but because patient expectations and physician responsibilities 
are oriented by the dominance of one principle or another as determined by a complex 
sociology of clinical practice.91 
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On the one hand, respect for autonomy was meant to protect persons from unnecessary 
harm in the course of medical experimentation while at the same time reducing 
paternalism from the medical field. However, Pintos and Weisstub argue that in practice 
the very opposite may happen when autonomy alone is taken into consideration:  
     Following the principle of autonomy may even encourage one to act with unjustified 
paternalism, that is, to overrule the patient's explicit refusal, simply because one views 
that choice as not being autonomous. Thus, the principle of autonomy may lead one to 
deprive a person of freedom without an adequate justification for doing so.92 
 
According to Rendtorff the concept of autonomy should act “as a guideline in 
bioethics...to express our wish to provide humanity and the human person with the 
necessary protection in these fields.”93 If the objective of respecting individuals’ 
autonomy is the respect for persons and the protection of human rights, then according to 
Brody the concepts of autonomy described thus far is inadequate.  He calls for a 
“normative framework” which would include notions of human dignity, integrity and 
vulnerability.
94
 Likewise, Thomasma also argues that “ the principle of autonomy should 
be combined with the protection of human dignity, integrity, and vulnerability – to 
successfully respond to how human rights can be properly linked to bioethics ...”95  An 
important application of this can be seen “in cases concerning unborn life, embryos, the 
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fetus, the human body and its body parts… the principle of autonomy is of little 
significance because one cannot say that any of these have moral autonomy.”96 
In closing, Rendtorff proposes five meanings to autonomy:  
(1) the capacity for the creation of ideas and goals for life;  
(2) the capacity of moral insight, “self-legislation” and privacy;  
(3) the capacity of rational decision and action without coercion;  
(4) the capacity of political involvement and personal responsibility, and  
(5) the capacity of informed consent to medical experiment”97 
 
These meanings, if incorporated into the philosophical underpinnings of today’s applied 
bioethics, could address the issues discussed above.  However, what is needed is a 
mechanism other than reliance on the four principles. Perhaps we find a clue in Sartre’s 
belief in the possibility of humanity’s existential authenticity:  
     But to Sartre, even though the human individual is free to choose his or her own 
existence, this condition is often hidden in an inauthentic life of self-deception. 
Perhaps a philosophy of existential authenticity can overcome the bad faith and self-




The next Chapter will explore the concept of communitarian bioethics, which some argue 
can provide a corrective to the pitfalls of principlism. In particular, I will explore how the 
notions of community and common good influence the way we frame the four principles, 
especially that of respect for autonomy.  
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Chapter 2:   The Communitarian Approach  
Today, the influence of principlism has grown to the point that healthcare, medical 
sciences and public policies are relying almost exclusively on its concepts to make value 
judgments.
99
 However, increasingly over the past decade, many stakeholders have been 
questioning the efficacy of relying solely on the principles to evaluate issues, especially 
given the extent to which new technologies challenge our notions of health, happiness 
and what it means to be human. For example, Daniel Callahan argues “that given the 
complexity and unknown nature of new technological developments, ‘principlism’ is no 
longer sufficient by itself to adequately frame bioethical enquiry.”100   
The main argument here is that autonomy lacks the scope to take into consideration the 
impact of an individual’s choice on the greater society. For example, the legal consent for 
physician assisted suicide may be desired by a terminally ill patient but that same legal 
framework could be used to euthanize the weak and vulnerable in our society.   
In response to these challenges, some bioethicists began to look for a deeper 
understanding of what the goals of healthcare should be and how these relate to 
individual choice and the public good. The field of philosophy also undertook a parallel 
exploration of societal changes with respect to the understanding of morality, virtues and 
culture as a result of the influence of modernism. The two lines of inquiry would intersect 
with the development of a new focus in bioethics. This new focus would move away 
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from the procedural approach of principlism towards more hermeneutical ones. The 
perceived advantage by those who advocated this shift comes from the understanding that 
“hermeneutics involves cultivating the ability to understand things from somebody else's 
point of view, and to appreciate the cultural and social forces that may have influenced 
their outlook.”101 As such, these new approaches borrowed concepts from virtue ethics, 
narrative ethics, casuistry and communitarian ethics. A common element to all these 
approaches was a call for bioethics to include space for reflection, a greater 
acknowledgment of the importance of culture and a return to the study of the patient as a 
human subject. Though none of these approaches received wide acceptance in the clinical 
milieu, communitarian-based bioethics did garner a greater amount of interest from 
academic circles.   
Because the foundations of communitarian bioethics are drawn from communitarian 
social and political theory, I will begin this chapter with a brief introduction to the main 
concepts of the social theory to provide us with some context for the discussion. 
2.1 The Communitarian Philosophy 
The core of communitarianism, as the name implies, is the community, and it is the 
community’s shared lives which contribute to the support of a good society. The core of 
modern American communitarians is primarily focused on the tension between the 
common good and individual good, in part to provide a counter measure to the 
overarching dominance of American liberalism and its counterpart, individual rights and 
liberties. Though a full discussion on the American communitarian theory is not possible 
here, this chapter will draw on two key concepts that underpin this philosophy: The 
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common good and its relationship to individual choice and the role of community. In 
particular, I will draw primarily on the work of Emitai Etzioni who was one of the 
pioneers of contemporary communitarian philosophy that emerged in the US in the 
1980’s.   
2.1.1 The Common Good  
The main focus of communitarianism is the common good.  In the North American 
context, communitarianism is particularly concerned with balancing the pursuit of the 
common good while protecting individual rights. Communitarianism assumes that both 
“individual rights and the common good are irreducible moral commitments and that both 
are essential pillars of a good society.”102 In essence what this means is that a common 
good does not serve only a particular individual or segment of a society, but benefits all 
members simultaneously, and even extends to consider future generations.   
The common good is not a new concept. In fact, it was first developed in antiquity by 
Aristotle. Aristotle understood the common good to be linked to individual good in that 
the good of the community should be oriented towards the good of its people.”103 
Moreover, his  philosophy of the common good was not just about framing community 
life, but emphasized that it was premised on good actions of its citizens. The theory of the 
common good has also been extensively developed in Catholic social policies. For 
example, Thomas Aquinas took up the Aristotelian concept of the common good but 
from a theological perspective, whereby he argued that the ultimate good was God. 
Therefore, to Aquinas, good actions were grounded in the divine as well is in the 
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temporal notions of living in community.
104
 Catholic theology, therefore, promoted a 
philosophy of the common good that was expressed in the real and tangible ways that a 
community is set up to support the flourishing of all its citizens.
105
 
Contemporary Catholicism continues its appeal for society to consider the common good.  
John Paul II advocated for a common good which he premised on the fact that humans 
are a priori social creatures, and thus there is a natural solidarity between individuals and 
the quest for the common good. He describes the relationship between human solidarity 
and the common good, as “the firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to 
the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual, because we are 
all really responsible for all.”106 Pope Benedict XVI continued in this tradition with his 
Encyclical Caritas in Veritate where he called for a renewed reflection of the common 




2.1.2 The Tension between the Common Good and Individual Good 
However, today’s society under the influence of modernism and multiculturalism has lost 




In particular, one of the major challenges in grasping a definition of the common good is 
due to the weight given to the ideology of liberal individualism and the strong influence 
of the market economy. Together these two forces influence society’s evaluation when it 
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comes to choosing among possible courses of action by promoting a cost-benefit 
approach, which gives greater weight to individual good.
109
 In fact, the liberal point of 
view holds that each individual should be able to determine their own concept of the 
good and that the common good is only the collection of all the individual goods.
110
 This 
thinking leads to the belief that the common good is no longer relevant to society as each 
individual is free to determine and pursue what is good for them. What this means then, is 
that the common good is replaced by the ideology of human rights. In a practical sense, 
as David Hollenbach puts it, public institutions who “secure these rights for all persons 
are thus seen as helping realize the interests of everyone…[which] breaks down the 
common good into the effects it has upon the well-being or rights of the individuals who 
make up society.”111 What little vestiges of the common good remain are understood in 
utilitarian terms, that is, its’ goal is to maximize the amount of goods for the greatest 
number of individuals. In such a society, people’s “moral and religious points of view 
play no relevant role.”112 Religious and moral grounding have been replaced by the 
concept of justice on which the State relies upon to justify its actions to guarantee free 
choice for all individuals.
113
  
Though communitarianism argues that the common good is not equal to the sum of all 
individual goods put together, the philosophy holds that individual good is nonetheless 
one of its core values. Though the starting point is the society, it maintains that the 
common good must also include the good of the individual, from a perspective that the 
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two are related and not coincidental.
114
 It is not lost on the communitarian approach that 
individual good must also have expression in the society as a litmus test to ensure that the 
common good is not heading towards paternalism.  
There are various expressions of the communitarian ideology which are distinguished by 
how a society weighs the common good with respect to individual rights as well as how it 
understands the meaning of community and responsibility. For example, a communitarian 
philosophy that sets the common good a priori with respect to individual good is what 
Etzioni coined “authoritarian” communitarianism. This polarity is mostly found in 
oppressive regimes, but lesser forms of authoritarian communitarianism can be found at 
various points in history when democratic societies set consideration of the common 
good above individual rights without the due process of deliberation. 
Etzioni also framed another form of communitarianism which he called “responsive” 
communitarianism (also known as liberal communitarianism). As opposed to the 
authoritarian philosophy, responsive communitarianism considers the common good on 
an equal footing with individual good, whereby each society determines in a democratic 
fashion the weight assigned to each of them.
115
 In other words, the common good and 
individual rights are held in tension with each other, with neither of them being held a 
priori. An example of responsive communitarianism can be found in the American legal 
system. The concept of the common good is fully integrated in the jurisprudence, and is 
weighed alongside individual rights in cases where they are in conflict with each other.
116
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The courts can, and have, ruled in favour of the common good, thus infringing on an 
individual’s right, in cases where the good of the society would have been seriously 
compromised otherwise. In a democratic system, this is done through deliberation with 
representatives of the community who work out the weight of the common good and the 
individual right at stake in a particular conflict according to values to which the 
community holds. The need for deliberation is key in the responsive form of 
communitarianism, whereby the role of state is one of facilitator. To this point 
Argandona states that the “task of the State is to enable and promote the common good, 
but not to define it nor, therefore, to impose specific content that might realize it.”117  
One of the main counter arguments for seeking the common good is that it is too abstract 
to be grasped in the real world. However, though the common good may appear to be 
invisible, Micah Hester assures us that it does exist and that “with focused determination 
it can be discovered.”118  Argandona describes this process of discovery in terms of 
meeting the challenge of bridging the tension between the common good and individual 
choices:  
The relationship between the common good and private goods is often presented in 
terms of confrontation, as if the pursuit of the second were incompatible with the 
pursuit of the first, or as if the good of society were a burden to individuals…the 
good of the person is not opposed to the good of society but is a part of it…the 
tension between personal good and common good is resolved dynamically; a 
person has a duty to achieve the good for himself, but he only achieves his own 
good if he also achieves the good of society, which is oriented to the person.
119
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However, the challenge, which Aristotle himself conceded, is that a society must be a just 
one, in order to be truly oriented towards its citizens and similarly, each person must have 
a moral orientation towards duty to society. In this way, there can be an integration of 
various preferences, abilities and institutional focuses.
120
 
Yet some argue that the nature of American culture, with its pervasive influence of liberal 
individualism and human rights, remains a stumbling block in trying to bridge the 
common good with individual good. This is where the second component of 
communitarianism, that of community, plays a key role. Argondona advances that what is 
needed in order to achieve the common good in this case, is for individuals to change 
their perspective on how they should live together in society. The notion of being in 
community, he believes can lay the ground work. In particular, he argues individuals 
must come to understand that they can only obtain their individual good(s) by 
cooperating within the community. Thus it is each member’s cooperation which “closes 
the gap between the pursuit of the good of each individual and the pursuit of the common 
good.”121 
2.1.3 Defining Community 
The concept of community is very large. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus 
on the main elements and assumptions that characterize community in communitarian 
philosophy with particular attention to how this relates to the concept of autonomy and 
individualism in ethical enquiry. 
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The role of community in communitarian philosophy cannot be overemphasized. A 
healthy community is one in which there is a balance between the common good and 
individual good. When this balance is achieved, the community itself becomes a “major 
common good”122     
Aristotle understood community as being more than passively living together. The 
community was about choosing and generating good actions so that all members could 
enjoy a good life. In this mindset, individual good was not diametrically opposed to the 
common good.
123
 By that same token, however, when the sense of community is not 
strong there is bound to be suffering by some or all of its members. Etzioni observes that 
signs of a weak community can be seen when social unrest erupts, when there is a rise in 
various forms of addictions or when individuals turn inward in selfish pursuits.
124
   
However, as I mentioned, “community” is a complex notion.  For instance, it can mean a 
gathering of like-minded individuals, it can mean a context in which certain cultural 
traditions are expressed, and it can also mean the process by which lives are lived. The 
traditional North American perspective of community is one in which individuals who 
share common values, morals and interests come together. But more importantly, from 
the viewpoint of an ethical framework, this understanding of community is grounded on 
the notion of self-determination. That is to say, such a moral community is based on an a 
priori assumption that individuals are autonomous, free to make their own moral 
opinions which they bring to the community.
125
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However, communitarians argue that this understanding of moral community is too thin, 
especially in the context of ethical inquiry. A thick understanding of community begins 
with an a priori assumption that humans are intersubjective, which is to say that humans 
live and interact in social groups. It is within these groups that an individual receives an 
education, works and socializes. Furthermore, it is through this enmeshing of interactions 
that creates social dependence on interpersonal relations and with the institutions that 
support daily living. In other words, social relations and the individual members are 
mutually fulfilling. Etzioni argues that members of a community do not simply have 
values and interests in common  but share a commitment to these values that are 
expressed through a “collective history and meaning.”126 Thus the community is not an 
assembly of atomistic individuals; “it becomes a moral space in which things have a 
value insofar as the prevailing culture gives them meaning.”127   
It is in this context that Charles Taylor argues that self-determination can only happen 
because of the intersubjectivity of the members of a community. That is to say, the 
communitarian philosophy begins with an a priori assumption that a moral community is 
the necessary condition for self-determination.   
 Accordingly it becomes evident how much morality is influenced by the social context 
of a community. Ten Have makes this point rather eloquently: “it is the face of the other 
[that] makes us moral beings whether we like or not” and it is morality’s “inter-personal 
character [that] makes it possible to scrutinize and criticize individual moral choices.”128 
This is a key point for the process of ethical deliberation. More precisely, it means that 
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community is participatory, and that moral choices are not static, but are the end result of 
communal choices and actions.  It is through a deliberative process that individual 
members come together to shape what values, interests and goals the community will 
commit to. 
This leads to an interesting new way of framing community proposed by Allen Buchanan 
and Micah Hester, who argue that the very process of participation is what defines 
community. Hester states that “moral relationships happen between individuals and 
communities wherein the activity of moral deliberation in the face of moral conflict is 
itself process community.”129 From an ethical standpoint, deliberation is not about 
defining shared values, but is the action of shared valuing.
130
 This concept of community 
can only be validated in conditions that set the intersubjective nature of humans a priori, 
which establishes the possibility for open dialogue, mutual understanding and action. 
2.2 The Communitarian Turn in Bioethics 
Early development of communitarian bioethics focused primarily on providing a counter- 
argument to the overriding influence of the principle of autonomy. Thus discussions took 
on a more authoritarian stance, as it tended to skew ethical deliberations towards 
favouring the common good over individual rights. By the late 1990’s, however, 
scientific advancements on genomics and genetic engineering, in particular, pushed the 
communitarian argument beyond the common good-individual rights debate, towards 
looking for better ways to engage communities in order to unpack the social meaning and 
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implications of these new technological advancements.131 For example research involving 
genetic engineering, such as manipulating germ cell lines, have far reaching implications, 
such as altering the genetic makeup of future offspring, even entire populations. Because 
of the scale of potential impacts of new technologies, bioethics needed to develop a 
framework to work out a balance between individual choices and the good of society, 
something that was not possible within the four-principle approach. 
The result of this was a gradual shift towards an ethical framework that sought to balance 
both the good of society with individual choices. These lines of enquiry were grouped 
together in what Etzioni called responsive communitarian bioethics.
132
 In contrast to 
principlism which was primarily procedural and focused on autonomy and consent, 
responsive communitarianism’s objective was to ensure that the social impacts and future 
considerations of technological advancements were included in the ethical deliberations.
133 
 
Daniel Callahan was at the forefront of communitarian bioethicists who began to call for 
a reframing of ethical discourse. He began by situating bioethics within the broader 
philosophical discussions resulting from the mounting disquiet on the moral state of the 
society led by philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. In his article 
“Tradition and the Moral Life,”134 Callahan acknowledges that changes in the 
understanding of morality and perceptions of virtues were affecting society’s response to 
bioethical challenges.
135
 Though many academics were exploring the impact of these 
changes from a philosophical perspective, Callahan was seeking a practical 
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understanding.  For example, Callahan’s response to MacIntyre’s statement that “a moral 
life must be a coherent personal narrative lived in common with others, based on a 
morality of virtue,”136 was that it needed to be grounded in the actual context of life lived. 
More specifically, Callahan argued that community needed to be defined to provide a 
context within which virtues and actions are defined.
137
 He concludes this article by 
calling for the need to develop a moral tradition of investigation that seeks out values and 
goods that combine both bottom-up (how individual values fit in the mix of other’s 




As scientific advancements continue to challenge traditional understandings of health and 
healthcare, bioethicists begin to further elaborate lines of enquiry which sought to give 
place to “solidarity, equity, and public good.”139 Rooted in the Christian moral tradition, 
“solidarity” is meant to express what humans have in common. Vulnerabilities, interests 
and an underpinning responsibility to each other influence the choices we make through 
the mindfulness that these choices impact others in our community. In a similar vein, the 
notion of equity directs our ethical choices so as to promote a fair distribution of health 
among fellow humans and reduce inequality among various communities.
140
 In a general 
sense, the public good serves to “strengthen community by sustaining an environment 
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conducive to both individual and collective human flourishing.”141 In a practical sense, if 
we take “public good” to be synonymous with “common good,” then what is expected 
from each individual is not a simple devotion to the common good but a reasoned 
deliberation on the conditions and limits of the common good.
142
  
However, before we can begin to assess the impact of medico-scientific advancement and 
start evaluating our choices, we need to take a step back and think about what is meant by 
medicine in general: what is it, what are its goals, is it just a process of natural science or 
is there another dimension to it that needs to be explored? 
2.2.1 The Challenge of Communitarian Bioethics 
The challenge in asking these questions, however, is that medicine is “typically non-
communitarian.”143 Though the tradition of medicine is a long one, it has for the most 
part focused on the patient-physician relationship. These relationships were based on trust 
and perceived authority of the physician. Furthermore, physicians have been generally 
limited to providing basic care, in the form of diagnostics, giving comfort and palliative 
care to specific individuals.
144
 However with the advancements in science, medicine is no 
longer just about caring for the wellbeing of a particular individual. The ability to extend 
life, the development of contraceptives, and genetic manipulations all have far reaching 
repercussions that go beyond the individual patient, the community and even extend to 
future generations. This new technological context has created a challenge for defining 
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the common good, in particular, because it has caused a change in the nature of medicine, 
health and healthcare. But the idea that medicine as a common good is slow to anchor 
itself in the North American culture, in large part because medicine (and by extension 
healthcare) is still perceived in terms of the patient-physician relationship, and very much 
focused on individual needs, wants and choices.  For example, a discussion paper entitled 
Medical Care and the Common Good
145
 submitted to the President’s Commission on 
Bioethics, undertook an exploration of healthcare from a communitarian perspective. In 
this paper, the authors stressed the need for government to think about medicine as a 
common good, and stated the following: “We argue that medical care shares some 
qualities of the public good, but it is best seen as a critical element of the common good, 
which gives it a special moral standing and makes a special moral demand on a society 
that seeks to establish a safe and fertile ground for its members' pursuit of happiness.”146 
Though the Commission posted the paper as background information, it did not 
incorporate its recommendations into the final document, or their policies. 
Given the extent to which advances in the medical field have affected our lives, we also 
need to grapple with how these advances have influenced our shared values which in turn 
push our culture one way or the other.
147
 If we wish to create a flourishing society, we 
must develop a moral perspective to deal with these new complexities. What is needed to 
achieve this flourishing is a public pursuit of comprehensive ways of understanding the 
human good and how to envision the future of health and medicine. This can only be 
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achieved if we commit to making political and social decisions about which choices will 
and will not be good for us as a community and about which principles, rules and virtues 
ought to govern healthcare.
148
 
In conclusion, two issues remain unresolved in the literature that have particular 
significance for this thesis; first, how to actually balance individual good with the 
common good in a real world setting remains elusive in academics works.
149
 There are 
many assumptions, do’s and don’ts, but no actual roadmap on how this can be achieved 
in the North American context of liberalism, market economy and pluralistic society. 
Second, though communitarian bioethics has argued strongly that principlism lacks the 
moral rigour for today’s ethical challenges, it remains nonetheless an important 
component of bioethics. Beauchamp and Childress’ four-principles (respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice) with their long standing tradition in 
bioethics, are also considered integral values to bioethics and espousing a communitarian 
approach need not reject them.
150
 Etzioni and Callahan believe that a more robust 
communitarian bioethics should include these principles. However, they argue that these 
principles need to be reframed to include the common good and include a platform to 
address the tension between the common good and autonomy (as it relates to choices of 
individual goods.) This second point will require further unpacking which will be 
addressed in Chapter three.  
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As for the first issue of balancing the common good with individual good, I believe 
Micah Hester’s work on processive community is a promising starting point, given that 
bioethics needs a strong community in order to facilitate the dialectical process of 
working out personal choices with public policies in the context of conflicting values.
151
 
As Hester argues convincingly, “all inquiry develops community.”  Hence we need to 
develop an approach to engage in ethical inquiry “that encourages a creative process that 
builds and strengthens our bioethical communities, situated in the current cultural 
context.” 152 In turn, this will support the development of healthy communities where 
solidarity, equity and concern for the public good transpire to the betterment of society. 
However, Hester’s “process” needs further unpacking on how to identify the correct 
issues to be deliberated on and how to address the human nature of those participating 
who are influenced by their respective culture(s). Callahan offers us some insight on how 
to address these lacunas.  
Callahan’s work shows a consistent unpacking of the communitarian philosophy with the 
mindfulness that “doing ethics” takes place in the context of real life, with its 
complicated intricacies of less-than-perfect people, competing needs and wants in a 
constantly evolving world. Furthermore, he does this while remaining ever mindful of the 
tension between the common good and the quest to obtain individual good. 
A great example of how Callahan approaches these challenges can be found in his article 
“Individual Good and Common Good: A Communitarian Approach to Bioethics.”153 This 
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article stands out from the pack because it turns the focus of bioethical enquiry on the 
person doing the ethics, rather than trying to work out more methods and theories.  
There are two key components to Callahan’s strategy: the first is contextual and consists 
of asking the right set of questions based on knowing what issues are at stake, the second 
is introspective, and explores analytical virtues needed by the persons “doing” the ethics.  
The point that Callahan is making by stressing the importance of context, is that it is not 
wise to go about randomly adopting any new technology – we need to stop and think 
about where we are going. However, in order to do this thinking, Callahan argues that we 
need to develop three virtues in particular: rationality, imagination and insight. These 
three virtues constitute analytical skills, which work synergistically to support a more 
“comprehensive judgment.”154 However, Callahan leaves it to the social science to flesh 
out the details of how to incorporate these virtues in bioethical deliberations.  
I believe it would be a worthwhile venture to unpack these virtues more fully in the 
context of ethical deliberation as these are essential skills to bring to moral dialogues that 
“combine passion with normative arguments and rely on processes of persuasion, 
education, and leadership.”155 What is interesting about Callahan’s exploration of 
analytical virtues and the common good is that they are remarkably similar to Bernard 
Lonergan’s work, particularly that which is developed in Method in Theology.156 Because 
of the proximity between the two scholars, Chapter three will explore in detail how the 
two can work together to develop a hermeneutical approach to framing the common good 
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Chapter 3: Bridging the Principle - Communitarian Divide  
So why is it so important to seek a way to bridge communitarianism with principle-based 
bioethical enquiry? The answer is two-fold: first, as was demonstrated in Chapter one, 
bioethical enquiry needs a counter-weight to society’s focus on individualism and respect 
for autonomy which strongly privileges principle-based enquiry. Secondly, as we saw in 
Chapter two, it is only when people come together in community that the collective 
judgement process might take place, which in turn promotes choices benefitting all 
members in society. What remains to be unpacked, however, is how in a practical sense, 
this bridging can be achieved.  
This final chapter will first investigate if and how, the communitarian approach might 
provide a corrective to the pitfalls ascribed to principlism, with particular attention to the 
stronghold of the concept of autonomy in making bioethical evaluations. The second part 
of Chapter three will be dedicated to exploring how theological concepts might inform 
and help bioethics achieve a bridging of communitarianism and principlism. In particular, 
I will draw from Bernard Lonergan’s concept of the structure of the human good to 
propose a reframing of the meaning and significance of human rights, liberty, individual 
good and common good, by re-introducing the centrality of transcendence. The chapter 
will close with a discussion on how Lonergan’s structure of the human good might 




3.1 Communitarianism as a Corrective to Principlism 
James Childress suggests that “correcting” the principles would consist of reframing the 
principles to consider the intersubjective nature of human beings and the role of 
community.
157
 This implies adding a line of questioning which would include notions of 
the common good. In more concrete terms, when weighing and balancing the principle of 
non maleficence, for example, debates would also evaluate the impact of choices such 
that no harm was done to human welfare, such as the community’s values and 
institutions. Beneficence would not only seek what is truly good for individuals, but 
would transcend the good of the individual to include that of the community. Similarly, 
justice would go beyond questioning the fairness of a particular issue towards an 
individual’s rights, for instance, but would also question whether an action or policy was 
fair and responsible towards the good of the society. For example, a communitarian 
approach would evaluate if making an expensive genetic-screening test available to some 
who desired it, is a just use of public healthcare money.158  
 
However, this reframing would have a significant impact on the principle of respect for 
autonomy.  As we saw in Chapter one, Western society’s notion of autonomy is based 
largely on the concept of freedom of rights which sets the individual good a priori over 
any concerns of the common good.  Currently, rules and regulations such as those set by 
governing boards that oversee clinical and research bioethics, have leaned strongly 
towards protecting a “severe form of individualism.”159 Tauber argues that such an 
emphasis on autonomy leaves very little room for a morality of care and responsibility: 
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“The sense of responsibility exhibited by physicians and nurses arises from their 
commitment to care for others, not primarily from a set of rules designed to protect 
patient autonomy.”160 On this point, Tauber has made several appeals for medical ethics 
to re-evaluate patient autonomy by reinstating the notions of personhood supported by an 
ethic of care and responsibility. 
How this translates into a corrective to the principle-based bioethics is a reorientation 
towards the common good: If this is so, then the goal of bioethical debates is no longer to 
“fix” a particular problem, but to drive toward promoting the common good such as 
promoting a fair distribution of health care resources. This can only be achieved through 
the community’s reflective process. As we saw in Chapter two, the community is “a 
moral space in which things have a value insofar as the prevailing culture gives them 
meaning.”161 In other words, the community of enquiry, acting as a litmus test of sorts, 
may help guide a society towards making fair and responsible choices benefitting the 
common good.  
 
This reframing also supports, rather than squashes, the principle of respect for autonomy 
as it situates the individual within which community he/she belongs.162 Callahan makes a 
powerful statement regarding the impact of scientific advancements: “the most powerful 
impact of biomedical change has not been confined just to the body.  It has no less left its 
                                                          
160 Alfred Tauber. “Sick Autonomy.” p.493 
161
 Antonio Argandona. “The Common Good.” IESE Business School. University of Navarra. Working 
Paper WP-937. (July 2011). p.6 
162
 James Childress. “Communitarian Bioethics” Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. (2007) p.41 
 52 
 
mark on those individual perspectives and social institutions that change the way people 
think about themselves and live their lives.”163   
Thus, communitarianism can help us move bioethics from the current practice of making 
judgements that are shaped by individual needs and desires to more comprehensive 
judgments which include “reflecting on the meaning, import, and acceptability” of 
science and medicine.”164  Callahan calls for bioethical enquiry that would include a 
concern for the greater good, the good of society: “Above all, bioethics needs to develop 
the capacity to help individuals make good moral decisions in their own lives and to do 
so in the context of that most basic of all moral questions: how ought I to live my life?”165 
Callahan argues, however, that what is currently missing in the bioethical arena is a 
mechanism enabling us to evaluate how medico-scientific advancements are impacting 
our lives.   
However, there is a caveat: being part of a community and espousing its values and moral 
standards doesn’t mean mindlessly going along with the crowd.  Individuals must 
somehow retain the ability to be “reflective moral beings.”166  Ten Have argues that it is 
this intricate balance between being situated in community and retaining a reflective 
distance that allows for the possibility of ethical evaluation: 
     Although human beings are fundamentally dependent on community, man as moral 
being still has the potential to ethical reflection. Constituted as a self by societal 
culture, he at the same time can obtain some reflective distance, creating independence 
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from the particular roles, goals and values that characterize the societal culture. 
Otherwise, the possibility of ethical reflection should only consist in explicating and 
articulating the values and goals prevailing in the societal culture, without the 
opportunity of critical disengagement.”167  
 
It is this “critical disengagement” that allows one to ask “is this indeed the right thing to 
do?” This is a critical point especially given the extent to which new scientific 
advancements have influenced societies’ accepted values, virtues and what it considers 
the good life.
168
 “Scotus argued that the essence of freedom was not merely the capacity 
to choose but rather adherence to the good that one chooses…A richer concept of 
freedom would incorporate the value of what is chosen...”169 In other words, without 
looking at the goods we choose and the values we uphold, how do we know if the choices 
we make are ethically viable, or if we are choosing for good or evil? Alasdair MacIntyre, 
writing from a virtue ethics perspective, argues that: 
     …only when a group arrives at a commonly shared understanding of what is in fact 
truly excellent in a particular circumstance can authentic common action proceed... 




To recap the chapter so far, some important questions have been raised in the context of 
the strengths and weaknesses of both principlism and communitarianism. These questions 
are related to issues around the heightened focus on the principal of autonomy in Western 
culture, the importance of individual freedom, the difficulty of settling on truth claims in 
the context of a particular community’s values and the question of what constitutes a 
virtuous person and how might one foster virtuous living. These questions lead us now to 
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the central aim of this thesis and into a consideration of the thought of Bernard Lonergan 
and what he might contribute to this discussion. 
3.2 Lonergan: Freedom, Objectivity and the Structure of the Human Good 
Chapter one explored the principle of autonomy and how, despite it being one of four 
important principles offered as tools for bioethics, it came to be emphasized to such an 
extent that there emerged a danger of cutting off the human person from his or her 
relationship with the community. More precisely, the principle of autonomy became 
reductionist and, as is argued in Chapter one, created significant problems in deliberating 
bioethical issues. Chapter two explored the critique of the communitarian perspective 
against such an overemphasis on the principle of autonomy. For communitarianism, 
autonomy lacks the scope to take into consideration the impact of an individual’s choice 
on the greater society. While there is recognition on the part of the communitarians that 
there needs to be more of a balance between principlism and communitarianism, there is 
no clear path laid out to foster this balance. Thus this next section will focus on four 
important questions which emerge from this debate.  
First, while the principal of autonomy is grounded in respect for the human person, this 
grounding appears to have been lost with the overemphasis of certain aspects of 
autonomy such as individualism, the individual and human rights and the privileging of 
the individual good eclipsing a broader consideration of the common good. How might a 
consideration of the human person be put forward that begins to correct this imbalance? 
Second, while the issue of freedom has never been far from the consideration of 
autonomy, human rights and the individual good, what exactly is understood by 
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“freedom” needs to be clarified. For example, is it possible to think about freedom in 
such a way that it broadens out to take into consideration the good of more than just the 
individual? Third, a concern for the possibility of “objectivity” in relation to the 
“common good” has surfaced in this thesis. Yet, how might one negotiate an 
understanding of “objectivity” in the midst of cultural, religious, ethical pluralism? How 
might one find a common basis for dialogue? Finally, concern for “virtue” and “virtuous 
living” is raised. Truly flourishing human communities require virtuous people, yet, what 
exactly does it mean to be “virtuous” and how does a community foster virtuous persons? 
These four questions lay a path that this section on the thought of Bernard Lonergan will 
begin to address. Lonergan’s contribution is at the level of method. He provides tools of 
analysis to foster what many are calling for in relation to the rehabilitation of respect for 
persons, a broader understanding of freedom, a consideration of objectivity that flows out 
of a person’s capacity to make judgements of fact and judgements of value, a dynamic 
understanding of the human good that provides important insights into the relation 
between the individual and the social and how this relationship works toward the 
promotion of the good at three different levels. Furthermore, Lonergan’s method helps us 
to grasp the notion of “conversion” that sheds light on how persons grow and develop 
toward more virtuous forms of living individually and in community. Thus, the 
contention of this thesis and what this section will attempt to explain is how Lonergan’s 
tools of analysis might help to bridge the gap between principlism and 
communitarianism. This will involve three tasks.  
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The first of these tasks will be to explore Lonergan’s explanation of the cognitive 
structure of the human person. It is here that light is shed on a more complete picture of 
the principle of autonomy and its connection to respect for (or the dignity of) human 
persons. Also important is how the cognitional structure is related to the notions of 
freedom, objectivity and authenticity with its connection to virtue and virtuous living. 
This sets the stage for the second task, explaining how Lonergan develops an 
understanding of the human good in such a way that we see the intricate connection 
between the individual good and the social good and how it is not really possible or 
beneficial for one to be cut off from the other. From the first two tasks, the way is paved 
to shift from a language of rights to a language of love. In this third task, the discussion 
enters the explicitly theological dimension of the thesis and again, Lonergan’s 
contribution is valuable. We revisit the notion of freedom or liberty and the notion of 
conversion.  
Central to Lonergan’s methodology are the notions of how we can come to be able to 
perform these analyses, gain insights and perform evaluations correctly, that it is a 
manner that directs us towards the good. The key to Lonergan’s work is to understand 
first and foremost, that he is always seeking what is concrete, and not some abstract 
theory. Most importantly, as Sauer writes, for Lonergan “the good is concrete because it 
is what benefits, improves and enriches human living. It is what is good for individual 
persons, natural communities like family, and constructed communities like 
neighborhoods, nations.”171 Lonergan’s objective is to help us grasp what is real which he 
does by mapping out our cognitive processes by which we come to acquire true 
                                                          
171
 James Sauer. A Commentary on Lonergan's Method in Theology. (2001) p.61 
 57 
 
knowledge.  How we come to grasp reality is through a successive pattern of cognitive 
operations that lead us to a manifold of discoveries which, interwoven, begin to shape a 
picture of this reality. This process is premised on the fact that as moral beings, we can 
undertake cognitive activities with intelligence and reasonableness.
172
 
Lonergan’s cognitional process is highly complex and involves many sub-discussions 
which have been amply explored by theologians and philosophers. This section will serve 
to introduce the main concepts of the process as it underpins any successful attempt by 
individuals and societies in embodying the human good. This process can only begin with 
our willingness to engage in thinking introspectively, which in Lonergan’s understanding, 
means to approach our conscious activities objectively. As we are intelligent creatures, 
looking for insights (the quest for discoveries), is innate to us. However, it is only by 
undertaking this search for insights objectively, that is with detachment, are we then able 
to discern what is really true, or truly good. Being able to be objective is something that 
needs to be cultivated through the process of self-awareness which steers us towards 
seeking out the truth.  
Lonergan’s method differs from other cognitional theories in that it “transcends” the 
particular field or subject we are intending to know more about. His method seeks out all 
possible “opportunities available to the mind,” not by the power of sheer intellect, but by 
elevating our consciousness through the commitment to becoming ever more self-
aware.
173
 Through this process Lonergan moves us beyond “what we know - to seek to 
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know what we do not know yet.”174 What makes this method compelling in the context of 
this thesis, is its unifying character: because the cognitive process transcends all fields of 
study, Lonergan argues that it could promote the good of society by bringing together 
individuals from various disciplines in order to establish common norms and values.  
3.2.1 Cognitional Process Structure 
As a point of departure, we need to learn what true “knowing” is. For Lonergan, this is 
not merely looking around, or understanding a concept or making an evaluation. We 
come to truly know only through a successive and cumulative process. This process 
consists of cognitive activities which Lonergan describes as levels. This imagery of 
‘climbing’ each step reinforces the idea that the process is cumulative and that we can 
only move forward by successfully completing the objectives of the previous level. In 
addition to being cumulative, the process must also be progressive. That is to say, as we 
repeat these cognitive activities in search for what is true, we will make discoveries (or 
insights) which are the building blocks of authentic cognitive performing.
175
  
For Lonergan reality is not something we “know” just by looking – it must be 
apprehended through experience, framed by understanding and reflection.  Lonergan 
synthesizes this process into three levels: Experiencing; understanding; and judging. 
Experiencing: 
At the first level of the cognitive process we acquire data through our basic senses, such 
as seeing, touching or hearing. This activity is primarily “receptive” and though it is a 
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conscious act, there is no “mediation by [our] intellect” and it is not yet considered to be 
“knowledge” in the Lonergan sense.”176 
Understanding: 
The second level is the process which engages our intellect as we move from 
“experiencing,” that is the data we collected with our senses, towards something that is a 
‘concrete intelligibility’. We start the process of understanding by asking questions in the 
form of “what is it (that I am sensing)?” 177 The discovery of what it is we are sensing is 
what Lonergan describes as an insight, and more specifically, a direct insight.  
Judging: 
This third level of operations seeks to determine if what we understood is true - yes, or 
no- which is considered a judgement of fact. In order to make a judgement, solely 
possessing the facts is not sufficient – we must also have adequate experience and 
understanding.  Through a series of questions we review the first-level sense-data we 
collected to determine if our understanding was/is accurate. These questions are the basis 
of what will constitute true knowledge.
178
 It is by reflecting on the direct insights we 
acquired from the previous step, that we are able to judge if these insights are accurate or 
not.  This in turn becomes reflective insights. 
The concept of insights (both direct and reflective) is key to understanding Lonergan’s 
cognitive process, as it is through accumulated and shared insights that we begin to 
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apprehend the world around us.  Though the cognitive activities of understanding and 
judging are to be carried out individually, it is by drawing on the many experiences and 
insights of others that contribute to a fuller understanding and judgment.
179
 Moreover, the 
role of reflective insights underpins Lonergan’s premise that the process of knowing is 




Lonergan argues that it is only through objectivity can we come to truly grasp reality. 
That is to say, that objectivity begins when each of us can affirm our own experience, 
understanding, judging and choosing by being intelligent, reasonable and responsible– 
what Lonergan calls self-appropriation. The challenge here is to be willing to engage in 
the process of self-appropriation which is in itself a life-choice as it is a life-long pursuit.  
If we so choose to embark on this journey of self-discovery, we will understand that we 
come with biases (our own as well as those shared by the community) and fears.   
Of course in concrete settings when we attempt to make judgments of facts, we are faced 
with many challenges. For example, during the first level of experiencing, though we 
might be attentive to the data we are collecting, in real life there will be all sorts of data to 
sift through, some of which may very well be unimportant or we may be tempted to pick 
and choose only the data that supports our position.  We also have our own personal 
biases which manifest themselves as fears or desires that also shape what we will be 
attentive to. The challenge is that bias may be difficult to perceive, especially when the 
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“bias springs from the communal flight from understanding and is supported by the 
whole texture of a civilization?”181 
Lonergan’s method guides us to apprehend the dialectical nature of human knowledge 
that struggles between “bias and truth, inattention or insight, of irresponsibility or 
responsibility.”182  The more we become attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
responsible, the more we become “authentic” individuals. 
Authentic subjectivity 
When we consciously perform the cognitive activities, that is, when we experience 
attentively, understand intelligibly, and come to judgements of facts reasonably, we are 
closer to authenticity, or what Lonergan refers to as authentic subjectivity.  Authentic 
subjectivity is being aware of our biases, what questions we refuse to ask, what we  
rationalize in order to steer an outcome. Authentic subjectivity is what makes objectivity 
possible.
183
  The more we operate authentically, the more confident we can be on our 
cognitive achievements. 
Feelings 
We cannot deny the existence of, or the influence of, feelings. Lonergan asserts that these 
intentional feelings are what drive us to act in response to the knowledge we acquire. 
Lonergan distinguishes two basic types of feelings: non-intentional, which arise without 
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conscious effort, such as hunger, and intentional feelings, which arise consciously. It is 
this latter type of feeling that I will focus on. 
There are intentional feelings that respond to self-interest. These do not lead to the 
apprehension of value. These feelings relate to what is in a current frame of reference and 
are limited to apprehending what we find agreeable or not, at a given point of time. 
However, what does bring us to the knowledge of values is what Lonergan calls “self-
transcending feelings.” Self-interested feelings focus on merely what is pleasurable or 




William Sullivan states that for Lonergan, “the valuable is discovered, not created,”185 in 
a way that self-transcending feelings will apprehend values according to a scale of 
preference: vital values, social, cultural, personal and religious. Vital values are those that 
are constitutive our lives, such as health. Social values “condition the vital values of the 
whole community” and are preferred to vital values, while cultural values define the 
meaning of our shared lives and are preferred over social values. Personal values are our 
very self-transcendence.
186
 The most desirable set of values are religious, which take 
shape by a profound relationship with God. 
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The fourth level processes “become the object of my question of value”187 that is, “is it 
good?” We ask the question “is it good or worthwhile” because we anticipate the 
presence of value upon which we will decide, or not, to act. Value judgements can also 
be negative, such as “is it bad? 
Sullivan argues that through this process we come to know what is good by “what [we] 
intended in [our] questions for deliberations and know through our value judgements.”188 
However, as mentioned previously, values are apprehended in feelings. Sullivan lays out 
a dualistic nature of apprehending values. On the one hand, our “intended values stem 
from a restless heart, rather than mind” while at the same time “it is by a responsible 
(versus rational) compulsion that there follows a judgement of value.”189 That is to say, 
values are apprehended in our feelings and confirmed cognitively. 
Questions for deliberation can only occur with the undergirding knowledge gained from 
judging what is real.
190
 Sullivan articulates another important aspect of the fourth level 
activities; in addition to making judgements which determine if an actual fact is indeed a 
value, we also seek relative judgements by which we compare/weigh among other actual 
values that may be relevant to a particular issue. This activity of deliberation is what 
gives way to choices.
191
 As we progress in the fourth level,  our focus towards being 
authentic moves us beyond being only rational, to seek out what is truly good (i.e. the 
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value we intended to seek out.) It not surprising then, that fourth level activities have 
their foundation in our moral and religious backgrounds.
192
 
As individuals share their discoveries and insights with others, so there develops 
knowledge, science and values in common. However, because true knowledge is never 
‘perfect’ or complete, there is bound to be some mis-information or distortions. It is  the 
measure to which each individual is committed to being attentive, intelligent, reasonable 
and responsible that errors will be corrected, and what is truly good will be grasped, 
driving societal progress. Essentially, these are the building blocks of the human good: “it 
is a history, a concrete cumulative process resulting from developing human 
apprehension and human choices that may be good or evil.
193
  
However, Lonergan stresses that conscious intentionality does not automatically lead to 
the good. The truly good must be freely chosen by us to come about. Freely choosing 
what is truly good cannot come out of coercion, nor is the process of deliberation 
sufficient to bring about the good: “the process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself 
decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating 
the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of actions.”194 So for 
Lonergan, fundamentally human beings are free. Being free gives us the capability of 
becoming authentic. In freedom, we can choose to strive to become authentic which in 
turn affects how we act within our culture and history. The changes that occur in us, also 
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change the world around us. 
195
 However, though we make a personal choice to move 
through each successive cognitive level to apprehend what is truly good, we do not 
undertake this in a vacuum, but rather situated in community. Therefore, human 
knowledge is a shared process as we learn from each other.
196
 
Lonergan’s cognitional structure shows us how virtuous living can be achieved through 
the gift of freedom combined with our conscious intentionality to live authentic lives.  
We can now move to the second task of this section that is to explore how Lonergan 
understands the connection between individual good and social good and how the two 
work synergistically towards the human good. 
3.2.2 The Human Good as a Dynamic Process.  
As we saw above, the good is both individual and social. What relates the personal aspect 
of the good with the social one is the interplay of our individual lives with our social 
relationships within a cultural context.  In other words, “...the good can be interpreted in 
relation to the reality of the individual, in relation to the reality of the individual in a 
socio-cultural world, and in relation to the reality of the person as subject intending 
value.”197 It is helpful here to visualise this as a threefold structure, where the good at 
each level “refers to a complex insight whose meaning expands as the horizon or 
interpretation expands.”198 What this means then, is that as we move from the first level 
towards the third, we achieve a more comprehensive capacity to evaluate morally or 
ethically which is reflected in the “good” that is attained at each level.   
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Schematic Representation of the Three Levels of the Good 
 
MEANING OF THE WORD 
"GOOD" 
HORIZON OF MEANING 
 
ATTITUDE TOWARD SOCIAL 
STRUCTURES 
 




Social structures as means to 
personal fulfilment 
 




Commitment to social order 
 
The Good as value 
 
The longer dynamics of 
historical progress and decline 
 
Commitment to historical progress 
 
The figure above illustrates the three dimensions of the good. The first column, “meaning 
of the good” describes the good that is sought out at each level. The second column, 
“horizon” frames which horizon we are grounding our insights of the corresponding 
good. The final column, “attitude towards social structures” is where we see the 
interrelationship between personal and social applications of the good. In order to 
understand this in concrete terms we need to tease out what “good” is sought at each level 
and what is involved for the individual and the social that brings about this “good” which 
ultimately ushers in the human good.  
Meaning of the Word Good 
Level 1: The good as satisfaction. At this level, the good is something that satisfies an 
individual desire or a personal interest. This level takes its meaning from within the 
horizon of an individual’s reality. As part of our earthly journey, each of us experiences 
needs and desires of all kinds such as food, shelter, education and the need for 
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companionship. Theses individual needs are satisfied by obtaining what Lonergan calls 
particular goods.
199
 Such goods are attributable to a certain person at a defined point in 
time (a breakfast, for example).   
Level 2: Represents the good as harmony, or what Lonergan terms “good of order.”200 
The good of order comes about when we expand our focus, from seeking to satisfy only 
our individual good(s) towards the good that is found in social order. This good is 
reflected in our social structures in how well they are able to provide the continuous flow 
of individual goods. When our institutions, such as our families, the State, or educational 
systems, work harmoniously, then the good of order is promoted. However, what is 
especially important to distinguish here, is that the good of order is not an assembly line 
of particular goods nor is it the formation of institutions. The good of order is itself 
inherently good or valuable, as Paul Hoyt-O’Connor states that it is the “regular and 
recurrent enjoyment and the ordering of human action [which] are themselves distinctly 
valuable.”201 As we advance from a focus on individual needs and desires from level 1, 
the good of order seeks its meaning from the reality of the individual within his or her 
socio-cultural world.  This advances our capacity to evaluate morally and ethically 
because there is accountability to a wider social order that transcends personal desires 
from level 1.  
Level 3: Good as value: this terminal level transcends the good in the previous two levels, 
as it moves from seeking the good as “developing object to involve the good as 
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developing subject.”202  In other words, it is the “good of the substantive personal value 
by which we judge the good....”203 That is to say we seek what is truly good, whether it 
be a social structure, or a particular good. Therefore, the values a society holds in esteem, 
will be reflected in its social structures as those values will form the “rationale and 
justification of some one or another system of laws, of education, of economy, of 
polity.”204 Thus the good as value calls for a critical evaluation of social orders within 
wider, more universal horizons of historical progress or decline. We obtain a host of 
concrete insights into instances of progress and decline within historical living and within 
the ecologies which are our home. We can already see in these brief descriptions of the 
meaning of the word “good” the interplay between the individual, society and culture. 
Next I will unpack these intricate relationships and explore how each contributes and 
works together to bring about the good at each of the three levels.  
Referring back to the figure, the good as satisfaction is related to our individual interests 
or desires. However, in most cases, we need the help of others to obtain these goods. 
Accordingly, we enter into relationship with others in our society which can help us 
achieve a particular good.  It is within these relationships that our individual capacities 
enable us to work together, through cooperation, to contribute to the fulfillment of each 
other’s basic needs. How a group of people choose to cooperate depends on the insights 
each individual brings and shares in common with the others. As more insights are shared 
within a community, a pattern of cooperation emerges which is represented by norms, 
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rules and laws the community chooses to value or abide by.
205
 These patterns of 
cooperation evolve into social structures. When these social structures are exploited for 
personal fulfilment, that is, when they are governed at the first level of good, they 
become fragile.   
A more robust social structure, is one in which there is a healthy pattern of cooperation 
and commitment between individuals of a society. This is the central concern of the 
second level. In a cooperating community, people support each other in fulfilling their 
needs and work towards the good of order. They do this freely, through their roles and 
tasks they undertake in their community. What makes this possible is that “people are 
joined by a common experience, common or complementary insights, and by judgments 
of fact and value.”206 Furthermore, for Lonergan the appeal to values considered 
worthwhile is central to the formation of social structures, “it is by appealing to value or 
values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some 
systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others.”207 This is the reason 
why each society has many different schemes of the good of order.
208
 Moreover, the 
choice of values a society upholds becomes apparent in personal relationships. Patrick 
Byrne writes that “a group of people reveals the values to which they are collectively 
committed in the ways they treat each other.”209 Therefore, when individuals work 
together, with a commitment to social order, social structures become stable. When such 
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a commitment exists, concern for personal welfare becomes inseparable from wider 
social concerns. Eventually, concern for the social order eclipses individual desires.  
Again we saw that as we moved from level 1 to level 2,  the horizon of meaning moved 
from a concern of “self”, (first level good), towards a horizon of meaning framed by 
interpersonal relationships (level 2). Therefore when we move towards considering the 
good as harmony, we drive towards a more comprehensive understanding of the human 
good. However, this is still not the full picture. As mentioned above, a society chooses its 
social structures based on what values that society believes to be worthwhile.  This begs 
the question, how do we choose the truly valuable (or truly a good) and what motivates 
us to choose the greater good rather than satisfying a personal desire? The answer to this 
question lies deep within the notions of liberty, self-transcendence, conversion and 
history which are explored in the context of level 3. 
Level 3, moves beyond the first two levels as it explores human development through the 
perspective of society’s progress and decline. This is not an abstract theory; a society’s 
progress is the “actual, concrete functioning or malfunctioning of a set of relationships 
that are constitutive of human living.”210 These relationships are determined in part on 
how individuals come together in a society: to the extent that they enter into relationship 
as their authentic selves, there can emerge true particular goods, true good of order and a 
true scale of preferences regarding values and satisfactions within a given society. Over 
time, members of a given community who remain committed to seeking out the good will 
make choices that bring about positive changes for the society as a whole. As individuals 
develop so too do their respective societies. However, human development is not perfect, 
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just as human growth is not constant nor is guaranteed.
211
 Therefore, part of this 
commitment to historical progress necessitates a willingness to undertake a social critique 
of social structures with the goal of social renewal, as structures may become exploitive 
or even destructive with the passage of time.  
The process of social critique begins with the individual but is contextualized within 
one’s culture and society. As individual members share their discoveries and insights 
with others, so there develops knowledge, science and values in common. Furthermore, 
to the extent that each individual is committed to being attentive, intelligent, reasonable 
and responsible,  errors will be corrected and values will be grasped. However, because 
true knowledge is never perfect or complete, there is bound to be some distortions: 
“…there is sin, the failure to obey reason, the rationalization of sin in the social field.”212 
Hence, development is not only conditioned by the apprehension of value(s) but is 
also“…correlative [to the] moral and ethical practice which oppose bias and sin in the 
social process at every point.”213 However, we recall from the previous section that 
conscious intentionality to becoming authentic leads to the good when in freedom, the 
individuals choose to do what is truly good.  Kenneth Melchin frames Lonergan’s notion 
of freedom as central to the process of deliberation and moral growth: 
This positive understanding of freedom as self-determination begins to connect with 
our account of moral foundations. Clearly, the central feature of this idea of freedom is 
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our capacity to perform acts of moral meaning in which we size up situations, devise 
and evaluate courses of action, and begin to act on them.
214
 
Lonergan understands freedom as an innate attribute of all human. We exercise our 
liberty by “choosing our orientation in life and to become self-transcending.”215 In other 
words, deliberation and moral growth take place within a certain horizon (self-interest, 
social structure or historical progress), which Lonergan names “horizontal” liberty:  
“Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the 
bias of a corresponding existential stance.” 216 However, as we move from one level to 
the next we exercise vertical liberty in choosing to move towards a more comprehensive 
horizon of meaning. Vertical movement brings us closer to a more complete authenticity 
and is where our judgments of value are grounded.
217
 However, as mentioned previously, 
to the extent that we enter into relationships as authentic selves, and remain committed to 
working together, there can emerge what is truly good. The choice to remain committed 
to cooperation within our community is done in freedom: “They [people] are related to 
the commitments that they have freely undertaken and by the expectations aroused in 
others by the commitments, by roles they have assumed and the tasks that they meet to 
perform.”218 
Though we are free and have the potential to develop morally and ethically, what gives us 
the impetus, or desire, to advance from one horizon of meaning to the next - to move 
beyond our comfort zone? For Lonergan, this willingness to move from a horizon of self-
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interest to one of concern for humanity can only come from the dramatic thrust of 
conversion.
219
 As was discussed previously, our horizon is comprised of objective data of 
sense and data of consciousness on the one hand, and a subjective component, that of 
self-appropriation, on the other.
220
 It is reflected in human development and conversion. 
We move “horizontally” within a particular frame of reference propelled by interests and 
concerns we already have. Depending on our orientation, we will be open to certain types 
of questions or insights. As we develop, our orientation changes and we become aware of 
new possibilities. What propels us towards a new horizon is the “powerful experience of 
conversion”221 which develops out of the potentialities of the former horizon. The process 
of conversion changes our frame of reference (or horizon.)  
Conversion begins with the freely chosen quest to move “from a self-regarding to a self-
transcending orientation”222 – if there is no will to seek self-transcendence then no 
conversion can take place. Conversion is what allows to us to begin our journey towards 
self-transcendence by becoming ever more authentic individuals. Authenticity is 
expressed when we let go of unhealthy satisfactions, ideologies, biases, and begin to 
apprehend values:
223
 Lonergan distinguishes three types of conversions: intellectual, 
moral and religious. Though they are presented as separate entities, in actual fact, each 
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type of conversion participates in the development of the other as a “modality of self-
transcendence.”224 
Intellectual conversion, as we discussed previously, is when we come to accept that 
“knowing” is not just looking and that objectivity is not defined by seeing what’s “out 
there” to be seen. Such a conversion happens through the intermediary of our 
appropriating the operations of conscious intentionality.  Thus our reality is apprehended 
in the conscious effort to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible.  
Moral conversion happens when we make a conscious decision to move from making 
choices based simply on satisfaction towards choosing what is truly good.  In the case of 
conflict between a value and a satisfaction, our moral conversion will direct us towards 
choosing the good.
225
 How we come to be able to choose the good over human 
satisfaction is through grasping the reality of our lives by being attentive, intelligible, 
reasonable and responsible. Through this conscious intentionality we become aware of 
our own potentialities as well as failings, and thus direct our choices towards the truly 
good. Copeland states that through individual moral conversion “real solutions to 
complex problems emerge and genuine progress, which is the coincidence of true value 
and practical intelligent activity, is made more probable.”226 
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Religious conversion is for Lonergan “being grasped by ultimate concern. It is 
otherworldly falling in love.”227 It is a dynamic process through which we seek holiness. 
From a Christian perspective, it is our acceptance to receiving the gift of grace through 
the Holy Spirit. There are two key elements of how grace works in our conversion. The 
first is what Lonergan calls operative grace. This is what propels us to move towards 
Love, which is to move us beyond the horizon of a “heart of stone” to the horizon of a 
“heart of flesh.”228 However, conversion is more than falling in Love, it is also what we 
choose to do about it. Cooperative grace is the measure of how we live our conversion in 
our situatedness. In other words, from the perspective of the human good, cooperative 
grace is expressed in our human freedom through choosing good actions in our daily 
lives. Ultimately, Lonergan says it is the “complete transformation of the whole of one’s 
living and feeling, one’s thoughts, words, deeds and omissions.”229  
This three-fold structure can lead us to a fuller understanding of the human good and the 
nature of human transcendence. As we move from seeking the good as satisfaction, to 
good as harmony to ultimately seeking good as value, we move beyond a commonsense 
understanding of the world around us, towards a truly authentic presence. This structure 
also illustrates how our personal choices and life-journeys shape our interactions with 
others in our communities and ultimately impact our societies.  
Lonergan’s structure of the human good lays the ground work for the third task of this 
section, that is, to explore the explicitly theological dimension of this discussion. This 
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next section will show how Lonergan’s structure of the human good can help answer the 
questions I set out to answer. Copeland states that a theology analyzes “horizons...in 
which questions arise….it reflects upon human practice; and it seeks ways to foster and 
to collaborate in solutions for creating and healing in history.”230 To recap, in seeking to 
bridge principle-based bioethics with the communitarian approach, four issues emerged 
as central: the need to rehabilitate the notion of respect for persons, include a broader 
notion of freedom, the need for objectivity and how to foster virtuous living in 
community.   
3.2.3 The Theological Aspect of the Human Good 
From the Language of Rights to one of Love  
Let us take as a point of departure the language of liberty in association with human 
rights which underpins principlism. The commonsense understanding of liberty, in 
general, does share some parallels with Lonergan’s notion of liberty and freedom. Both 
understand liberty as the potential for self-determination and as “the active thrust of the 
subject terminating the process of deliberation.”231 But that is where the similarities end. 
For Lonergan, individual liberty is behaving freely and responsibly in our social matrix, 
while the commonsense understanding of freedom is one of entitlement (where one 
believes to be entitled to choose for him or herself without outside influences.)
232
 
Lonergan’s structure of the human good helps to move us from the commonsense 
understanding of liberty towards a fuller one of responsibility.  This is achieved when we 
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change our language of rights to a language of love that comes about as we embrace 
God’s love for us and begin to live by the Gospel message. A first step in achieving this 
is by taking stock of what defines our frame of reference. Are we attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable and responsible when faced with making decisions or do we just go along 
with everybody else? Do we ask questions from a self-interest perspective or are we 
considering the impact of our choices on others in our community?  It is through the 
impetus of God that we can come to the realization how the language of liberalism 
dominates our society and how it influences our individual and group choices, the values 
we choose to uphold and ultimately how we choose to live together as a society.
233
 When 
we orient our choice in values based on the highest good, God, we are then in a position 
to be authentically critical of the choices presented to us and our own course of actions.
234
  
William Sullivan stresses that the role of value judgment is pivotal in bioethics. He 
argues that the aim of bioethical deliberation is to find “some value that is a concrete 
actuality or a real possibility, rather than an abstract or unrealizable good.”235 Currently, 
the ideology of liberal individualism, through the legitimacy of the principle of 
autonomy, is often called upon to support our cultural aversion to sacrifice and suffering. 
Frederick Lawrence believes that this blocks us from being able to strive for the ultimate 
good: “when the ultimate good gets replaced by fear of death, the psychology of 
orientation gets replaced by a psychology of motivations...and so comfortable self-
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preservation becomes the primary ends of human beings.”236 However, as we set out on 
the road to conversion, we become attentive to our orientation through the apprehension 
of a shifting scale of values; our contentment for “mere life” underpinned by vital values 
becomes a desire for the good life shaped by religious values.
237
 As we commit to this 
process we gain a different understanding of the world around us and gradually let go of 
untruths that we hitherto clung to out of habit.  
Liberty and the Good of Order 
The language of liberal individualism affects not only our personal choices but also what 
the collectivity chooses to be an acceptable way of life. The exercise of liberty, through 
an individual choice is not private. Throughout Lonergan’s structure of the human good it 
becomes evident to what extent the language of liberalism influences our society.  It 
affects our personal relations, drives how we choose to live together and is made manifest 
in how we set up our institutions.
238
 The current North American notion of liberty has 
promoted a concept of the public good as something that should enable individuals to 
pursue their private goods. This has had a profound influence on the public policies that 
frame our health care institutions.   
The second level of the structure lets us analyze the social aspect of the human good. In 
particular, this is where we see the concrete effects of our personal relations by 
evaluating the measure to which our institutions contribute to the good of order. As was 
demonstrated in Chapter two, a collection of individual goods does not equal the common 
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good. Lonergan’s concept of the good of order shows us why this is so and how we can 
move towards a truly good, common good. The collection of particular goods that merely 
seek to satisfy our needs and desires does not lead us towards the good life.  Rather, it is 
in the “rational choice correlative with the human capacity for intellectual 
development”239 that will lead us to cooperate in the creation of a truly good, common 
good (good of order.) 
For example, the good of order which supports our healthcare institutions is underpinned 
by a rights-based ideology which steers our social policies, laws, and the technologies 
towards satisfying individual wants, and the social sciences have replaced the notions of 
value judgment with fact collecting. In such a scenario, judgments of fact and value, as 
Lonergan understands them, are summarily dismissed.
240
 Together, these two conditions 
create an environment whereby bias sets in on the part of individuals, groups and 
institutions which leads to the denial that terminal values exist or are attainable. These 
challenges create a narrow frame of reference which reduces our collective ability to ask 
the right set of questions which in turn reduces the “horizon of meaning and value.” 241 
What this means is that when we attempt to evaluate alternate courses of action (for 
example, do we allow the use of a new medical technology, or not) we will not be able to 
do so with a common attentiveness, common understanding, or a common judgment. We 
will be attentive to what supports our own desires framed by individual and group bias. 
This is what David Callahan suggests in that “we” (in North America) are plunging 
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headfirst in adopting new medico-scientific technologies as they becomes available 
without any reflection on where these options are taking us. In particular, his concern is 
directed towards cultural changes which happen quietly, but pervasively, to such an 
extent that they become societal norms without anyone noticing the change. A counter 
measure to this is found in conversion. The structure of the human good demonstrates 
that it is only through the intermediary of religion can we grasp what is truly the right 
way to live. 
Will We Ever Agree on the Right Way to Live? 
Lonergan’s structure of the human good lets us take a step back and take stock of our 
culture and society. This process begins by intending value, that is, we embark on a 
journey of knowing because we are seeking what is truly good, as opposed to mere 
satisfactions. Insights will come about through understanding and judging. The questions 
we ask as we move between the levels helps us evaluate the impact of medical science on 
ourselves as subjects, on our families and on our communities. Lastly, as we become 
committed to living according to the Gospel message, with the thrust and courage that 
come from grasping the divine love for His creatures, we inevitably find challenges to 
our personal and communal lives in such a way that will bring about the human good. 
The right way to live begins when we use our capacity for development to reach out to 
the vulnerable in our society, when we make sound judgments about the state of our 
institutions, when we choose our actions responsibly. 
To summarize, the three levels of Lonergan’s structure of the human good illustrate very 
clearly how the good hinges on the degree to which individuals are willing to be 
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authentic in their lives, and how a lack of self-appropriation at any one of the three levels 
impacts the achievements of the human good. When individuals come together in 
commitment and understanding, this then becomes true common good.  Human good is 
the “concrete functioning…of a set of relationships that are constitutive of human 
living.”242  
Lonergan’s structure of the human good helps to move us from the commonsense 
understanding of liberty towards a fuller one of responsibility.  This is achieved when we 
change our language of rights to a language of love that comes about as we embrace 
God’s love for us and begin to live by the Gospel message. 
Thus, the objective of this chapter was to explore how Lonergan’s tools of analysis might 
help to bridge the gap between principlism and communitarianism. The lines of 
exploration focused on responding to four issues that emerged as central to bioethical 
enquiry - the need to reintroduce the notion of respect for persons, to have a broader 
understanding of the concept of liberty to reconcile individual good with the social good, 
to develop a consideration of objectivity to counter bias and foster good judgements of 
value, and what steps can be taken in order to develop more virtuous forms of living 
individually and in community. 
Lonergan’s cognitive structure helps us to develop a more inclusive understanding of the 
principle of autonomy by reframing it to include an expanded notion of freedom and 
objectivity. A key element of Lonergan’s cognitive structure is that it guides us from the 
commonsense understanding of liberty towards a fuller one of responsibility.  We move 
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towards this new understanding when we change from the language of rights to a 
language of love as we begin to live by the Gospel message. Embarking on this journey 
may begin to transform bioethics into a responsive bioethics, able to go beyond partisan 
advocacy and foster authentic collaboration. Through the notion of “objectivity” 
Lonergan provides a tool which helps us to dialogue in the midst of cultural, religious, 
ethical pluralism by guiding us to apprehend the dialectical nature of human knowledge 
that struggles between “bias and truth, inattention or insight, of irresponsibility or 
responsibility
.”243
 Thus, as members of an ethical community, we can enter more fully 
into dialogue with one another. Practically speaking, Copeland calls on social scientists to 
that “by putting our intellectual efforts to the service of the progress of the common good, 
[we] assume responsibility for creative and healing solutions.” Such creativity and 
healing, I believe, could be invaluable first steps in bringing people to dialogue about 
bioethical issues. Building on these first steps, a commitment to collaboration and open 
dialogue become the groundwork for countering ideological conflict fuelled by liberal 
individualism and human rights ideologies and promote a reawakening of the true 
essence of the principle of respect for persons. 
Bridging the gap between individual good and the common good in bioethical debates 
begins with a reformulation of what exactly is meant by the “good” and advocating for 
the good in such a way that individual good and common good are not pitted against each 
other. One of the ways in which Lonergan does this is by introducing the notion of the 
human good. The human good enfolds both individual good and the common good 
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thereby bringing the two closer together. Through the three levels of the human good, 
Lonergan leads us towards the apprehension that bioethical enquiry takes place within a 
matrix of individuals, society and culture. This framework may help bioethicists to think 
concretely about this matrix, since the “structure is the form of society.”244  The very real 
and personal aspect of others in our society leads us to engage in bioethical dialogue with 
a renewed respect for persons. Starting with our own commitment to authenticity we 
begin to see others in our communities as “…concrete men and women as persons –
flawed, struggling, created and yearning for God, capable of understanding, of conscious 
and intentional decision making, of transformed and responsible living, of converted 
relationships.”245 This reminds us that ethical decision making is being made by 
imperfect beings, for imperfects beings, in an imperfect world and through Lonergan we 
see to what extent that bridging the gap between principlism and communitarianism 
necessitates an effort on our part to apprehend, understand and diagnose ethical 
dilemmas. Lonergan’s contribution provides a counterbalance to arguments that say that 
values are too subjective or abstract to be of any use to bioethics. In fact, Sullivan puts 
values at the centre of ethical dialogue: “Value judgments underpin bioethical 
issues...what we are aiming at in ethical deliberations is some value that is a concrete 
actuality or a real possibility.”246 From Lonergan we see how individual good and 
common good shape the human good which is determined by how we, as knowing 
subjects, are the originator of values when we choose to lead authentic lives.  
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Lonergan further contributes to bioethics by giving theology a contemporary voice. 
Though theology has a long history of countering attitudes and actions that devalue the 
human person,
247
 Lonergan’s tools of analysis encourages a dynamic understanding of 
morals and ethics through the lens of personal and communal horizons in which we seek 
answers to fundamental questions about life and seek “ways to foster and to collaborate 
in solutions for creating and healing in history.”248 Pope Benedict XVI made a statement 
that supports the relevance and legitimacy of Lonergan’s theory: “To be authentic, the 
defense of rights must instead consider human beings integrally, in their personal and 
communitarian dimensions.”249  
So far I have explored the pattern in the history of individuals and of societies that 
Lonergan speaks of as progress, decline and redemption. From the perspective of 
bioethics, where life and death are often at the centre of debates, this explicitly Christian 
paradigm allows for death and suffering not to be the final word. Rather, as we saw, 
Lonergan provides a way of thinking that may bring the messages of hope and 
redemption emerging through the very experience of suffering and death. This message 
of hope has never been more needed than in the context of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide debates. In the final section of this chapter, I will re-frame a discussion 
on euthanasia that is taking place in the province of Quebec through the lens of 
Lonergan’s structure of the human good. The objective of this case study is to illustrate 
that it may be possible to find a common basis for dialogue, not only between principlism 
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and communitarianism, but between all members of our Western society regardless of 
cultural, religious or ethical pluralism.   
3.3 Case Study: Legalizing Euthanasia in Quebec 
To illustrate more concretely how we can engage Lonergan’s structure of the human 
good as a bridge between principlism and the communitarianism, I will explore the 
debate on euthanasia that took place in Quebec in 2009-2012.  The exploration will 
situate Lonergan’s cognitional theory and the three levels of the human good particularly 
in the context of helping us to understand the impact of the principle of autonomy and the 
human rights ideology on the euthanasia debate. 
3.3.1 Euthanasia Debate in Quebec  
The province of Quebec recently concluded a four year investigation of the subject of 
euthanasia.
250
  A Commission was set up to conduct an initial feasibility study, which 
culminated with the final report entitled Mourir dans la dignité
251
 (dying with dignity), 
which will be referred to from this point as the Report. 
The Commission prefaced their deliberations by framing the current context of end-of-
life experience for Quebecers in response to medico-scientific advancements that have 
led us to live longer, however in certain cases, to the detriment to the quality of life.  The 
Commission stated that compassion, solidarity towards the suffering and that the respect 
for their autonomy as well as the protection of the vulnerable in our society, are 
cornerstone values that underpin our communal lives and are the guiding principles for 
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decision making and action. Moreover, the Commission’s efforts were further propelled 
by a possible legal loophole allowing Quebec to bypass the Civil Code, which prohibits 
euthanasia, under the auspices that health is a provincial matter. 
Thus, keeping in mind the stated values, the Commission began its work by putting forth 
three questions which would direct their efforts: 
1) How do we, as a society, respond to the suffering expressed by some terminally ill 
people?  
2) How do we react to requests for help to end life?  
3) How do we ensure that all members of our society die with dignity?  
As a first step the Commission began collecting data they would use to evaluate these 
questions and make recommendations to the Quebec Parliament.  Data collected 
consisted of empirical data, life-stories, key informant interviews, online surveys and a 
review of the Legal system as it applies to end-of-life care. 
Building the Case: Respect for Autonomy and Human Rights 
In 1994 the Civil Code of Quebec enacted the principle of respect for autonomy and the 
obligation to obtain free and informed consent from individuals. From this decision, 
individuals obtained the right to refuse or to terminate life-sustaining treatments. One of 
the supporting arguments brought forth by the Commission was that euthanasia, by virtue 
of informed consent, is simply an extension of the right to refuse end-of-life treatment.
252
 
The Commission held that human dignity is both intrinsic and subjective. Even when a 
person has lost their independence or the ability to interact with others, they still retain 
                                                          
252
 Assemblé national du Québec. Mourir dans la dignité –. p.59 
 87 
 
their dignity which is a fundamental principle that is innate to  being human. 
Furthermore, the Commission argued that since human dignity is directly linked to 
autonomy it can be inferred that individuals are in the best position to evaluate when their 
lives are no longer worth living.
 253
  
When asked if euthanasia could have a negative impact on the common good, the 
Commission argued that the common good is always being redefined by the changing 
mentalities and values of the community, and thus it can have many aspects, which 
includes the promotion of individual rights such as autonomy and that the values of 
compassion and solidarity towards those who are suffering is also contained therein.
254
 
Furthermore, by virtue of the obligation to respect individual rights, the Commission felt 
that it was in the best interest of the Government to acquiesce to the demands for 




Final Arguments in support of physician-assisted suicide 
 
The Commission extrapolated that since persons in the end-of-life stage are deemed 
capable of consenting and requesting terminating life-support or for palliative sedation, 
then “logically” a patient should be deemed capable of consenting to and requesting 
physician-assisted suicide at that time. The Commission further concluded that medical 
help to precipitate death in end-of-life situations was compatible with Quebec society 
values and should be legalized with the condition of being framed by strict rules and 
guidelines.  
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The Commission offered further justification for moving forward with legalizing 
euthanasia based on the College of Physicians’ belief that euthanasia is within the spirit 
of the deontological code of medical practice and that the principle of autonomy has 
become a fundamental principle in medical ethics.
256
  
3.3.2 Discussion: Lonergan’s Structure of the Human Good as a Bridge between 
Principlism and the Communitarianism in the debate on euthanasia.  
 
As Copeland observes “political thought about the meaning of the good, the meaning of 
justice, the meaning of the right way to live, has reached an impasse,” 257  this is 
especially true for discussions on euthanasia. From the details of the Report, it becomes 
apparent that the Commission relied almost exclusively on the principle of respect for 
autonomy and the ideology of human rights in their recommendation to the Province it 
should proceed with allowing euthanasia. However, there is an inherent weakness in 
relying on the principle of autonomy as the sole measure of the appropriateness of a 
particular action; by saying that individuals have a right to choose euthanasia the 
Commission bypasses the need to make any ethical evaluation on the decision to 
decriminalize euthanasia. Therefore, the principle of autonomy trumps the need to ask 
questions regarding any impact of someone’s choice for euthanasia on the common good. 
However, as was demonstrated in Chapter three, both individual good and the common 
good are irreducible component of a good society.  
Taking into consideration the discussion on Lonergan’s structure of the human good, a 
more beneficial way of deliberating about euthanasia would be to move away from 
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relying on science, public policy or law in order to justify a particular stance and begin 
the process of evaluating euthanasia from the standpoint of care, compassion and actions 
promoting the human good. The following is by no means an extensive analysis of the 
euthanasia debate, but only an illustration of how Lonergan’s methodology might inform 
this debate. 
Euthanasia as a Particular Good 
Many of the human rights debates take place within the confines of the first level of 
Lonergan’s Structure of the human good.258 At this level choices are personal and there is 
no moral evaluation on the choice of particular goods. If we end our ethical deliberations 
here, which is what happens when we invoke “the right to choose” as justification for a 
particular good, we leave out questions regarding value, i.e. what is truly good for me and 
my community? What is happening, in essence, is the subordination of the second and 
third levels of the human good (Good of harmony and the Good as value) to the first. 
259
 
Euthanasia and the Good of Order 
The second level of the human good situates the euthanasia debate within the social 
context. Medical care is an institution that may or may not give rise to a good of order. If 
the medical community fails to assume their responsibility, fails to cooperate there will 
follow a breakdown in the good of order. Human rights can only be actualized within the 
institutional patterns of the good of order. Patrick Byrne argues that when we do not see 
God in the other, this is reflected in institutions that are impersonal and bureaucratic. 
260
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There is clear evidence of this in the Report. In many instances the Commission justified 
euthanasia by referring back to the set of governing laws, rules, regulations and their 
supporting institutions.  
Euthanasia and Terminal values 
The third level frames the euthanasia debate within the cultural context. The principle of 
autonomy and the human rights ideology are so pervasive that they have permeated our 
cultural mindset and have played a large role in shaping the orientation of our society. 
For example, it is through the lens of human rights that the Commission understands the 
concepts human dignity, compassion and solidarity: to be compassionate, is to give in to 
an individual’s choice to die, to ensure human dignity is to protect an individual freedom 
of choice and to be in solidarity with the suffering, is to acquiesce to their request for 
euthanasia.  
Furthermore, the human rights ideology also limits the scope and scale of questions asked 
by the Commission. Individuals can only enquire about what is in their horizon of 
interest. For example, the Commission only sought answers to questions that would 
support the autonomy of individuals to choose euthanasia; it was never asked whether or 
not euthanasia is indeed a proper response to suffering.   
The Commission gave significant weight to popular opinion surveys which indicated a 
strong majority of citizens in favour of euthanasia. From a commonsense point of view, 
the option of euthanasia that is putting people out of their intolerable suffering seems like 
a compassionate thing to do. Almost anyone can relate to how difficult it is to stand by 
while a loved one suffers. However, when this commonsense understanding is combined 
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with the general bias that each individual should decide for themselves when their lives 
are no longer worth living, it effectively shuts down the deliberative process and the 
search for value. 
For example, given that all Commission members were elected officials to the Quebec 
General Assembly, representing both the Parti Québecois and the Liberal Party, they 
were no doubt operating within the horizon of politics. Within such a horizon, it is 
plausible that Commission members could have been swayed on the one hand by the 
“popular” vote, as well as the general bias of the culture of individual liberalism and 
human rights ideology. From the Report it seems apparent that this bias impeded the 
Commission from conducting objective deliberations. For example, the Commission was 
selective as to what data they “believed” to be true as they disregarded other data that did 
not fit with their objectives. More specifically, in the Report, the Commission clearly 
states that they were aware of some reports signaling cases of abuses involving 
euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium, but they found reasons to discredit their 
sources instead of investigating further.  
Therefore, we might ask ourselves, how such bias on the part of the Commission 
members could be mitigated. Part of the answer lies in changing the horizon, or frame of 
reference in which the members are operating. As we saw previously, Lonergan argues 
that we can only change our horizon through conversion (intellectual, moral and 
religious.) However, in a practical sense, one does not “convert” instantaneously: it is 
often a life-long process and is only possible if one actively seeks to be converted. 
Therein lies another challenge, from the Report we get a sense of the strong antipathy of 
the Commission members for anything resembling religion or spirituality. For example, 
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the Report clearly states that religious values have no bearing on the State’s decision 
making process, given that Quebec is a secular state. How can such group bias fueled by 
hatred for the Gospel message be overcome?  It begins with the each individual making a 
conscious choice to initiate the process of healing and creating the human good. We 
create the human good when we, as members of the human community, begin to move 
towards attentive experience to intelligent understanding to reasoned judgment to 
responsible choice of actions. These individual choices begin to shape a new society, as 
each new situation builds upon the next, with further insights and more meaningful 
courses of actions, leading towards progress. However, it is only through the redemptive 
Love of the Gospel message that can heal the destructive impact of bias.  
It would be a challenge to engage a discussion on redemption and God’s love with the 
Commission, unless some common ground can be found. It is interesting to note that the 
Report was built on the central themes of compassion, solidarity towards the suffering 
and the protection of the vulnerable in the society – also cornerstone values found in the 
Gospel message.  Perhaps in speaking to the shared experience of human vulnerability 
and suffering could be an invitation to dialogue. 
The Process of Decline 
Clinging to the general bias of the human rights ideology will continue to distort any 
further deliberative efforts by the Commission, or other Provincial institutions. It is only 
a matter of time when this general bias, if it goes unchecked, will become the new norm 
for society. In fact Cioni argues that this will become “the way that things are done, the 
only way that one can live, indeed the way that all successful and respectable people live. 
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One can swim against the current for a while but sooner or later one gives up.”261 If this 
trend is not reversed it will continue to lead Quebec society towards a cycle of decline.   
One of the strongest criticisms of euthanasia is the very real apprehension of what 
happens when a society enters this cycle of decline. Without moral grounds to defend 
human dignity, the weak and the vulnerable become easily expendable. This point was 
brought to the Commission’s attention in a brief submitted by Dennis Stimpson,262 where 
he quotes Wesley J. Smith, a Senior Fellow in Human Rights and Bioethics at the 
Discovery Institute. Smith attests to the fact that once a rational argument for euthanasia 
as an option for relieving suffering has been accepted, this rationalisation becomes 
applicable more generally: 
Euthanasia has been around long enough and practiced sufficiently enough for us to 
detect a pattern. Killing is sold to the public as a last resort justified only in cases 
where nothing else can be done to alleviate suffering. But once the reaper is allowed 
through the door, the categories of killable people expand steadily toward the 




This last observation is crucial and should sound the alarm. The Commission’s 
deliberations were inconclusive towards euthanasia requests for individuals suffering 
severe handicaps as a result of traumatic injuries or for people wanting to request 
anticipatory euthanasia in the case of Alzheimer’s or dementia. We can see how this is 
not far off from the above scenario. Now is the time for conversion of hearts and minds:  
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     Lonergan’ s appeal to the concrete universal relation of humanity offers legislators a 
higher viewpoint from which to amend and regulate not only unjust laws, but to lay 
the groundwork for a society’s permanent change – the change of human hearts.264  
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What difference does knowing this make to my question? 
To go back to the original question of this thesis: can Lonergan’s concept of the human 
good bridge the impasse between principle-based and communitarian bioethics - I would 
argue that yes, it can.  
As I demonstrated in Chapter one, individual rights and liberty are at the core of 
principle-based bioethical debates. This greatly influences the questions we ask and the 
choices we make as we grapple with the many new scientific advances available to us 
and the shift in the underlying values that our culture supports in response to these 
advances. Though many have called for the inclusion of the common good in the 
bioethical debates in response to these challenges, there has been no consensus on how 
this can be achieved in our current culture, thus it has not gained much support in clinical 
settings. I would argue that Lonergan’s structure of the human good may provide a new 
viewpoint from which to enter into dialogue, as a starting point to bridging the gap 
between the two bioethical approaches.   
Lonergan in Dialogue with the Principle of Respect for Autonomy: 
We can see even more clearly why the concept of autonomy as linked to liberal 
individualism and secondly as a measure of consent, is a hollow understanding of the 
principle of respect for persons. In proposing a communitarian approach to bioethics, we 
saw that some emphasized two key issues: the need to ask relevant questions about the 
impact of the choices we make and the skills needed to develop in order to ask the right 
set of questions and evaluate them. The three skills according to Callahan are rationality, 
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insight and virtue.  In a very similar pattern we saw how Lonergan also argues that before 
we can make decisions, we must also be rational, gain insights, search for value, and 
strive to become virtuous. 
Community Versus the Individual: 
Much of the literature presented arguments that pit individual choices against the benefit 
to the greater community (i.e. the common good). Lonergan clearly demonstrates that 
the community is not some alien body interfering with our rights to make our own 
choices, but is a natural and integral part of who we are as individuals. Therefore, any 
serious attempts at evaluating scientific advancements in terms of its value must engage 
the community, since the community and the individual mutually express certain values 
in common. Together, both the community and the individual must seek out the common 
good. In order to engage the community, each member would need to look at the frame 
reference from which they are evaluating situations – for it is only through the personal 
relationship of truly authentic individuals will a community come together and make 
choices that will lead towards progress. The human good, with its patterns of 
cooperation must be something that each member of a community commits to over time. 
Authenticity, conversion, and the search for the true good, all take a life time of 
commitment. A society will make choices ushering it towards progress based on the 
cumulative insights within the historical context.  
Should We Use this New Technology? 
Another important question that bioethics attempts to answer is whether or not we can, 
or even should, use a particular new technology as it becomes available to us. However, 
before we can attempt to answer this question, Lonergan invites us to take a step back 
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and unpack how a new technology may affect us both individually and communally. 
Some questions for reflections may be: What should we do with this new science? 
Should we indeed use it? Is this technology worthwhile?  
 
However, the quality of these reflections as well as the choices we will opt for will 
depend in large-part on the measure to which we participate as authentic individuals. By 
taking responsibility for our own self-appropriation, we become the originators of values 
and through our participation in society we can influence it in choosing what is truly 
worthwhile. So when Callahan asks “what kind of future we envision,” Lonergan’s 
structure of the human good gives us a heuristic pointing us in a direction that we can 
follow together. Most importantly, Lonergan’s work moves us away from rigid, abstract 
and thin ethical methodologies towards an understanding of what builds, or destroys, the 
human good in the concrete setting of our communities. Lonergan’s structure of the 
human good guides us on how to take a step back and ask ourselves if what we are 
choosing, as individuals and members of a society, is indeed the right thing to do; will it 
lead to the kind of society we envision, one where our common values support each one 
of us to achieve our full potential and where respect for persons, justice and freedom are 
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